Archive 4

Archive 4

25 April 2010
BRAIN CAPACITY MIGHT DEPEND ON PROCESSING WITHIN NEURONS
In a recent paper Brian J. Ford argues that neuroscience has made a big mistake in viewing the neuron as a simple on/off switch, and concentrating its attention on the relationship between neurons, rather than understanding the neurons themselves. He points to the autonomous and intelligent-type behaviour of single cell organisms, and suggests that the capacities of the brain are based on the processing of individual neurons. This is reminiscent of Penrose's 1994 discussion of the abilities of single cell organisms, which was seen as an argument for quantum computing, within the complex quantum bonds of protein and water that make up individual cells.

Ford discusses the extent to which single cell organisms manifest autonomous and intelligent-type behaviour. He points out how some species of algae display a problem solving capacity, while other single cell organisms build symmetrical shells out of grains of sand. He also indicates the degree to which individual cells in the body are autonomous, responding to current conditions, without needing instructions from the brain.

In looking at the brain and neurons, Ford is critical of the strongly entrenched orthodoxy of modelling the immensely complex neurons as simple on/off switches. This is the more curious, in that much modern research is directed at the complex proteins of the cell interior. Ford wonders why neurons are allotted such a simplistic role, when single cells demonstrate the capacity for such complex activity. He points out how neuroscience is interested in the relationship between neurons, rather than neurons themselves.

He further hypothesises that the effectiveness of the brain will eventually be discovered to derive more from processing within neurons than from the relationship between them. He views the action potentials that set off the movement of neurotransmitters from one neuron to the next, as a language that neurons use to transmit data that they have already processed. He regards the brain not as a supercomputer, but as a community of microscopic computers. Attempts to develop artificial intelligence and robotics based on the neuron as a switch are therefore seen as a grandiose failure, a view that seems to be supported by a half century of disappointment with attempts to develop autonomous robots.

Finally, Ford recalls an eerie experiment in which the 40 Hz gamma synchrony, viewed as a correlate of consciousness in much conventional neuroscience, was adjusted to a frequency compatible with the human ear. He relates how this produced a sound with the hypnotic quality of the calls of seabirds, and a sense that each axon spike was modulating a discrete signal within itself.

To some, the discussion of capacities of single cells may sound familiar. In fact, the point was made by Penrose as far back as 1994, when he remarked on the sophisticated autonomous abilities of the single-cell paramecium. The proposal here was that single-cell organisms can achieve sophisticated behaviour, without the help of brains or nervous systems. This is suggested to be because individual cells utilise quantum computing based on cytoskeletal structures that are suited to information processing and on the complex web of quantum bonds within the protein and water that comprises the cells.

20 April 2010
INFLUENCE OF LOCAL PROTEINS ON NEUROTRANSMITTER RELEASE
This paper by Rinetti and Schweizer suggests that a protein system known as the UPS has a role in regulating neurotransmitter release. From the point of view of quantum consciousness theories this could be significant, given proposals elsewhere that cytoskeleton coherence could extend through presynaptic proteins and across the synaptic cleft.

The paper concerns the involvement of the ubiquitin proteasome system (UPS) in the frequency of neurotransmitter release. The established function of proteasome is to regulate the concentration of proteins, and to degrade wrongly folded proteins. Unwanted proteins are tagged for degradation by the ubiquitin protein.

In their recent paper, Rinetti and Schweizer suggest that the UPS may additionally be involved in the modulation of synaptic activity. The authors carried out a test of the effect of proteasome inhibitors on synaptic transmission. They measured the change in the frequency of miniature postsynaptic currents that reflected presynaptic activity, before and after the administration of inhibitors. A change in frequency indicative of what was going on at the presynaptic level became apparent with 10 minutes of the inhibitors being applied. This is taken to suggest that the UPS regulates presynaptic activity separately from its function in degrading unwanted proteins.

A further test showed that the inhibition of the synthesis of other proteins involved in neurotransmitter release had no influence on those inhibitors that had been shown to change the frequency of presynaptic activity, suggesting that the UPS's modulation of presynaptic activity was separate from both the synthesis and the degradation of protein.

A test in which the attachment of ubiquitin to proteins was blocked also produced an increase in the frequency of those postsynaptic currents that indicate presynaptic activity. The increase in frequency was regarded as surprising, but was also seen as indicative of the connection between the UPS and neurotransmitter release, and thence the UPS's ability to regulate neurotransmitter release.

19 April 2010
REASONS FOR HOSTILITY TO FUNDAMENTAL/QUANTUM THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
A paper by Barbara Monetero in the latest issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies is interesting for its shrewd analysis of the underlying reasons for hostility to theories that argue that consciousness is a fundamental or quantum property.

The author discusses the arguments of David Chalmers' who favoured an approach to consciousness called 'Russellian monism' after the philosopher, Bertrand Russell. This is the view that physics tells us only about the relationship between things and not about the things themselves, nor the nature of the underlying properties and forces, such as mass and charge. However, Montero wonders whether at the quantum level there really is a distinction between the level of the relationship between things and the level of the fundamental properties and forces. She argues that if there were an explanation for what these were, it might be in terms of a further relationship quality, presumably because it is difficult to conceive of anything else. This seems quite logical, but it somewhat evades the fact that, at least in terms of existing scientific knowledge, there does appear to be a level in the universe beyond which there is no further explanation.

At any rate, Montero is open to discussing the possibility that consciousness is such a fundamental property. She accepts that this can be consistent with the dominant physicalist view of science, if the fundamental level is not actually conscious as such (that would be panpsychism), but is merely a ground for consciousness to arise from, given certain favourable circumstances.

Montero says that although there is widespread disagreement about how to define physicalism, there is a measure of broad agreement that the features of the world arise from a fundamental physical substrata. Every feature of the world can therefore be traced back, and shown to depend or supervene on fundamental physical properties. From this simple definition, it would appear that any theory of consciousness that arises from the fundamental level is a physicalist-type theory, and does not involve any form of dualism.

Montero rather shrewdly seems to put her finger on the reason why mainstream thinkers are so unhappy with theories of consciousness that derive from the fundamental. She asks why fundamental properties that are mental should be accounted as non-physical, rather than as part of the physical universe. She says that she thinks that properties related to the mental are not regarded as acceptable parts of the physical world, because if the mental were seen as fundamental, it would have emerged like that from the Big Bang. She thinks that for 'some' this might in turn 'hint' at the existence of a God and further to that a human or mental-related purpose to the universe.

I think the important point here is not whether or not consciousness as a fundamental does suggest gods or purposes, but the fact that this gives a good idea as to why quantum/fundamental theories arouse, in many quarters, such unreasoning and unscientific hostility. Montero suggests that even researchers who may not be fully aware of the gods/purposes link may pick up on the generally bad reputation of fundamental consciousness and respond in hostile/irrational fashion.

17 April 2010
REVISION OF MICROTUBULE-BASED QUANTUM MODELS OF THE MIND
Danko Georgiev has developed a different proposal from Hameroff and some related researchers for the implementation of quantum consciousness in the brain; this would appear to include a Penrose-type quantum consciousness based on objective reduction of the wave function.

The main body of this paper argues against the type of implementation proposed by Hameroff. The author considers that the release of sufficient GTP energy to form the basis of computation is not feasible within stable-state microtubules, since such a release of energy would lead to disassembly of the microtubule.

I will not attempt to argue the rights and wrongs of the case as between Hameroff and Georgiev in respect of microtubule functioning. However, it does not appear that this paper should be taken as an argument against some form of Penrose-type quantum consciousness. At the end of the paper, the author expresses the hope that interaction between the electric field within the neuron and the 'charged elastic brain microtubules' might provide insight into information processing within neurons. His ideas in this respect are developed in greater detail in some of the other papers summarised in the Danko Georgiev section on this site.

12 April 2010
PROTEIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
This elements of this book are summarised as being a useful recent text book on protein, rather than because of any direct connection to consciousness studies. It is provided because of the indications highlighted elsewhere on the site that the physical presence of consciousness in the brain looks to be bound up with the mechanisms of protein, which even in conventional research reveals itself as a quantum engine. This suggests that if we are to understand consciousness, we need to deepen our knowledge of protein.

5 April 2010
NEW CATEGORY
A new category 'Protein' has been created under Related Topics reflecting the importance given to research in this area. Some of the same material will also be inserted under 'Protein&coherence.

5 April 2010
QUANTUM COHERENCE IN PROTEIN
An article by Cheng and Fleming discusses recent experimental advances in modelling and spectroscopic techniques, and their application to the study of electronic excitations involved in light harvesting by photosynthetic protein. These advances are connected to both Engel (2007) and Collini (2010), who have made observations of long-lasting quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems.

In the last decade, evidence has shown that the compact packing of some photosynthetic systems means that they cannot be described by traditional classical means. The traditional theory of excitation energy transfer in these proteins did not involve coherence, but this view has proved inadequate, because of the close packing of the pigments. Studies have shown that excitation energy transfer between blocks of excitationally coupled molecules proceeds via delocalised exciton states. Delocalisation here means that the energy of an electron is spread over an extended region. The photosynthetic complex has dense almost equally spaced exciton levels and strong excitonic coupling. This structure involves the spatial overlap of exciton wave functions, and theory predicts rapid energy transfer between exciton states that have a strong overlap of their wave functions. Traditional theories assumed independent fluctuations of energy at different sites, but recent experiments suggest that correlated energetic fluctuations might be important in pigment-protein complexes. Studies have revealed delocalised excitations and couplings, and show that the energy transport in the system depends on the spatial properties of the excited wave functions. The spatial/energetic nature of the complex allows the excitation to move to the lowest energy state (minima) in two or at most three steps.

Delocalisation states in pigment-protein complexes have been known to exist for some time, but it was only the development of two-dimensional spectroscopy that revealed the relevance of quantum coherence to the function of the complexes. In 2007, Engel et al proposed that quantum coherence promotes light harvesting. They proposed that a complex withing photosynthetic protein runs a quantum search algorithm that is more efficient than a classical system. The algorithm enables a rapid and reversible search for the site that connects to the reaction complex (the minima). Reversibility guards against becoming trapped in a secondary minima, which could happen with a classical system.

1 April 2010
PROTEIN: A CENTRAL ROLE
The further that I go into quantum consciousness, the more the central role of protein becomes apparent. The studies of Engels (2007) and Collini (2010) should serve to bring the special nature of protein centre stage. Even at the level of conventional neuroscience it is admitted that the configuration of protein is driven by van der Waals forces and by quantum tunneling, marking out protein as a quantum engine. Each change in the configuration of protein requires a minima to be quickly selected from trillions of possible configurations. If consciousness does lie at the quantum level, this is probably where we should look for it in the brain. Separate models for the implementation of quantum processing by protein have been advanced by Hameroff, Bernroider and Georgiev, all of them potentially compatible with Penrose's objective reduction idea. The possible importance of quantum activity in protein may extend beyond consciousness to quantum computing, which could solve the problem of how our perception of the external world is achieved. More speculative by far is the possibility that the quantum processing seen in protein comes down from some form of quantum search engine that enabled the original emergence of life. At the moment this is another hard problem for conventional theory. The odds against biomolecules assembling in the right order to produce a replicator are 4^165, adverse odds which suggests the primordial soup would need to have been larger the observable universe. This is exactly the type of situation, which can only be resolved by a quantum computer searching for the most efficient route.

The intention is to emphasise material relevant to protein in future postings on this site.

1 April 2010
SLIPPERY COMMENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS
The 3 April 'New Scientist' special report 'Frontiers of the Mind' is indicative of the slippery wave in which the establishment view on consciousness set up during the 1990s is insinuating its way into popular science literature. Once again the Libet experiments are trundled out without any reference to the fact that they only dealt with the most trivial of actions. It is further claimed that the unconscious controls the selection of conscious attention. This is very likely true in at least some instances. However, what is assumed but not said is that such unconscious control of the selection of attention, puts the unconscious totally in control of anything that happens after that as well. There is no logical reason given in this article as to why once consciousness has been directed at something that it should be unable to influence it. Indeed why would it be adaptive to direct conscious attention at something if it was unable to influence it? Of course the establishment is closet Cartesian, believing in a non-physical 'spook' consciousness, which by its nature cannot be physically efficacious. That might all be too much for popular readers, so we slide round the topic, with the assurance that 'big researcher knows best.'

The section on robotics and the possibility of conscious robots has a similarly slippery nature. It is acknowledged that consciousness or subjective awareness has been labeled the 'hard problem'. However, this hard problem is treated with airy assurances. This might seem justified if it was not that that artificial intelligence industry has made hardly any progress against this problem over nearly half a century, and if there was not a substantial query as to whether classical computing could achieve organic types of perception. The article floats over the top of this problem. It is suggested that the hard problem may evaporate. Subjective awareness may emerge from more sophisticated machines. Well, no one can say that it won't, while we still lack a consensus theory of what consciousness is, but it would be more convincing if there was at least a speculation as to what type of advances in future computer design would cause them to become conscious. Perhaps aware that this line of thought is not completely convincing, the article takes refuge in the well-worn argument as to whether we would actually know whether a robot was conscious. I think that this part of the problem is actually not as hard as is sometimes made out. At root, the difference in our experience of the conscious and non-conscious entities/objects around us is that former show preferences for one course of action over another that cannot be directly deduced from inputs from the present environment. We know in our own case that these preferences are driven by emotions of which we are subjectively aware, and which provide a common neural currency for comparing divergent courses of action, for instances the pleasures of eating a cake or losing some weight. It does not matter whether most researchers might judge these emotions to arise in a deterministic way, because they still provide a subjective force which is not present in the external environment.

1 April 2010
PENROSE AND OBJECTIVE REDUCTION
At a recent lecture to the Royal Society, Roger Penrose said that tests for objective reduction were being undertaken by Dirk Bouwmeester and others. This involved photons being bounced off a mirror. However, the experiment was described as difficult, and no conclusion is available at present.

30 March 2010
A MIND SO RARE
Merlin Donald's book is critical of the laboratory approach to consciousness, which he sees as working to artificially exclude the effects of consciousness. Laboratory studies are attacked for being obsessed with the very short term. The methodology focuses exclusively on short-term memory, allocation of attention within a fifteen second time span, and as a favourite subject, perceptual illusions. He regards this approach as a misrepresentation of the function of consciousness. He argues that consciousness is not just present in short bursts, but is an often a continuous background to the longer time frames, over which human social and other processes develop.

Donald discusses what is going on in lengthier conversations. This is seen as an extended control-process, including attention selection, maintenance of attention and allocation of priorities in the discussion. To make a conversation viable, it is seen as necessary to have overall awareness of what has gone before in the conversation. This is contrasted with the conclusion drawn from Libet-type experiments that because there is a time lag between the readiness potentials for trivial actions, and subjects becoming conscious of the will to act, consciousness must be something that continually lags our actions in the real world. It is this focus on the short-term trivial, rather than the medium-longer term governance of activity that is criticised by Donald. He emphasises the need in social and other activities for spontaneous innovation and patterns of cooperation with other people, types of behaviour not found in Libet-type experiments.

Donald says the mainstream researchers take the automatic and unconscious nature of much human activity as a proof of their position. However, he argues that much automaticity is based on learned skills, in which the learning requires consciousness. Turning the argument round, he argues that the ability to use such skills automatically is in fact an important benefit of having had consciousness in the first place. Consciousness is argued to be necessary for installing a large repertoire of skills that can later be used unconsciously. Consciousness is seen as being involved with medium-long term governance, planning and supervision.

In arguing for the importance of consciousness and its difference from the rest of brain processing, Donald emphasises that recent experimental evidence indicates that conscious perception depends on the functioning of specific pathways in the brain, and is not a general feature of brain processing. Furthermore, other recent experiments indicate a different configuration of neurons as being active, according to whether processing is conscious or unconscious.

Delayed response is seen as the hallmark of conscious organisation, with an idea as to how things should be done capable of overriding an immediate response to the environment. In the human, as compared to animal brains, consciousness is less about response to the external world, and correspondingly more about response to our own internal processing of events. An organism with this sort of processing becomes autonomous of the environment. Selectivity of attention , where it is decided that another signal is more important than the immediately attractive one is taken as another hallmark of conscious activity.

In looking at psychology, Donald points out that there are many patients who have normal short-term memory and attention, but encounter problems over longer timescales, particularly where this involves self-monitoring of their own behaviour. In contrast, Donald gives examples of patients that are seriously impaired in respect of short-term abilities, but through conscious determination over a timescale of up to years overcome some of these difficulties. Both of these instances are taken to indicate the importance of the longer-term operation of consciousness.

27 March 2010
BRAIN CHAT
A recent New Scientist article discusses studies that are viewed as supportive of Baars global workspace theory. Global workspace theory proposed that unconscious processing occurs locally in the brain, for instance just in the visual cortex. Conscious processing is suggested to always involve a neuronal assembly distributed across more than one region of the brain. It is argued that recent neuroscience has been supportive of global workspace theory. Stanislas Dehaerne's group have demonstrated dense connections between the prefrontal, parietal and cingulate regions, and suggest that the links between these are consistent with the global workspace idea.

Dehaerne's team have made a useful study of the difference between conscious and unconscious perception. Volunteers viewed two sets of stimuli, but in some tests the second set was presented in such a way that it was only registered unconsciously. The study showed that neurons in some brain regions, such as the prefrontal and parietal, stopped firing when the processing was not conscious, whereas they had a high level of activity when it was conscious. Other tests by the group produced similar results.

In fact, the main interest of these studies might appear to be the demonstration that conscious and unconscious brain processing are physically different, a position which is highlighted by the phenomena of blindsight. This contradicts the neuroscience/philosophical position evolved during the 1990s according to which consciousness was simply what it was like to have brain processing. The studies thus require an explanation of what is special about certain brain processing, so as to cause it to produce consciousness, while other areas do not. Convoluted arguments have been produced to get round the blindsight evidence, but even if these were substantiated, it would now also be necessary to explain Dehaene's studies.

However, neither these studies, nor the original global workspace theory, get us any nearer to an actual theory of consciousness. The theory might provide a solution to the binding problem, but it does not propose any reason why particular neurons or combinations of them are able to move from the unconscious to the conscious.

The attitude of neuroscientists towards consciousness is often hard to fathom. No mechanism by which consciousness could arise is proposed in the original global workspace or in this recent article, but Dehaene has, for reasons not explained, indicated that he expects that consciousness will somehow fall out of a more comprehensive workspace theory.

27 March 2010
DENDRITIC SPACE
Sergey Korogod and Suzanne Tyc-Dumont discuss the structure and function of the dendritic arborisation in their recent book, 'Electrical Dynamics of the Dendritic Space'. The shape of the dendritic arborisation of neurons differentiates nervous tissue from the rest of the organism, and the structural complexity of the arborisation is greater in more advanced organisms. Variations in dendritic arborisation define much of the difference between types of neuron. Dendrites receive signals from other neurons, glial cells and hormones, and the eventual output of the neuron is viewed here as the result of the total activity of the dendrites. The properties of the dendritic membrane, such as the distribution of ion channels, are constant across the arborisation. The different length of different branches and the variation in the diameter of branches of the arborisation are the main ways, in which the structure varies. Branches that connect to one another usually have different diameters. The authors speculate about the mechanism by which the complex asymmetrical branching structure of the dendrites governs the discharging pattern of neurons, but emphasise the sensitivity of the structure to small changes. The different dendritic sectors are seen as having a plasticity that suits them to selecting synaptic outputs. While it is not a part of this book, it is possible to speculate that quantum states might modulate such a sensitive system.

19 March 2010
A MOVE TOWARDS TESTING OBJECTIVE REDUCTION
An article in the March 17 issue of Nature discusses technology that could quite quickly lead to experiments capable of falsifying (or supporting) Penrose's idea of objective reduction. Penrose's hypothesis suggests that quanta that remain isolated from the environment, eventually decohere as a result of an increasing separation between the spacetimes of the individual quantum superpositions. Penrose called this hypothetical form of decoherence 'objective reduction', and controversially suggested that, in contrast to the randomness of the normal wave function collapse, mathematical understanding, subsequently extended to mean consciousness could enter the macroscopic world at this point of objective reduction.

Since the beginnings of quantum theory, there has been speculation as to whether large scale objects could be in quantum superposition. Particles such as photons and electrons can be in superposition, but the superposition collapses when they interact with the environment. The tendency to collapse means that in practice, we are not likely to see macroscopic superpositions in normal conditions on the surface of the Earth, but this does not mean that they could not exist somewhere that they were either isolated or shielded from the environment.

Andrew Cleland and John Martinis at the University of California Santa Barbara have created a device, a few micrometers long and one nanometre thick that can be brought to the quantum ground state or lowest possible energy state, where the only movement is the inextinguishable zero point energy.

In principle, a tiny vibrating machine of this kind can be in a superposition of two different places at once. If the size of such machines can be progressively raised, it means that it is in effect possible to test, whether or not there is a level at which superpositions collapse, or whether it possible to have superposition on any scale. Objective reduction proposes that the larger the object the faster the rate of reduction, and that is why we never see macroscopic superpositions.

Penrose himself said about two years ago that some of his colleagues were working on a test for objective reduction, and Hameroff listed this among his 20 possible tests for the Penrose/Hameroff consciousness model. However, I have not heard anything recently as to what the chances of this test happening might be.

16 March 2010
COMPUTERS, BRAINS & MATHEMATICS WITHOUT GODEL
Robert Hadley puts forward alternative possibilities to Penrose's argument from the Godel theorem, in order to reach a Penrose-type conclusion about brains and computers. He argues that a system that lacked consciousness would be incapable of certain concepts and certain proofs. Hadley refers to Kant's argument that the perception of an object requires the unity of consciousness. In modern terms, the difficulty of seeing how the unity of consciousness is achieved by the brain is referred to as the binding problem, and is not the same as, but is closely intertwined with the question of consciousness. The concept of objects is claimed to require certain assumptions about space and time, and also the categorisation of the objects themselves. Conscious experience may also be needed to understand the relationship of one object to another. In terms of mathematics, the natural numbers are an even set, which is conceived of as existing simultaneously. It is possible for human students of mathematics to think of an unbounded set of objects existing simultaneously, but this concept produces a circularity for computers.

There is also the question of understanding geometrically-based proofs, where to understand the proof, it is necessary to conceive a geometric design, as a whole or unit. This involves an argument concerning the situation where human perception is able to immediately see that an arrangement of dots comprises a hexagon, which is seen as a unit, whole or gestalt, although all that exists is a few printed dots, and there is no continuous hexagon printed on the paper. A computer analysis of the dots could generate the angles of relationship between them, but not by itself generate the idea of a geometrical objects such as a hexagon as a single cohesive whole. There needs to be a realisation that the dots at the corners of the hexagon (the only thing actually printed on the paper) belong together, and although something might be programmed in for particular dots, there is no way to generate this for arrangements of dots in general, from present forms of computation. It requires human conceptions about the parts of cohesive wholes belonging together to achieve this. Complex diagrams need to be perceived as integrated gestalt patterns. Therefore the author argues that it is not necessary to accept Penrose's argument from the Godel theorem, in order to agree with his main conclusion that brains and existing forms of computer are different, and consciousness not possessed by computers is required for some human brain activities.

13 March 2010
FASHION, FAITH and FANTASY
Roger Penrose should shortly publish a critique of string theory and inflationary cosmology under the title, Fashion, Faith and Fantasy in the New physics. This, once again, puts him very much at odds with the establishment, particularly in terms of inflationary theory, which has come to be regarded as a text book truth. Penrose's own position is that string theorists are not facing up to the theory's problems, with the exception of leading theorist Ed Witten, who has been trying to use Penrose's own twistor theory to reduce the number of dimensions needed in string theory.

The hidden agenda here is that inflationary theory has been viewed as a way of solving both the problems of string theory, and also through the multiverse concept of solving the fine tuning problem without the involvement of conscious agency or mind.

9 March 2010
QUANTUM ACTIVITY IN PROTEIN
The 21 st century may be the century of protein, particularly if we are going to make much progress in understanding organisms in this period.

In this respect Jeffrey Satinover's book, 'Quantum Brain' is mainly interesting for its discussion of quantum activity in protein.

The best section of this book is the discussion of the quantum aspects of protein, the basic building blocks of organic matter. A protein is a string of a hundred or more amino acid molecules. The amino acids are attached to one another by bridges called peptides, so that the protein is a macromolecule. Each amino acid has a unique shape, and a unique distribution of electric charge. For a protein to carry out its necessary functions within an organism, it must fold in a precise manner, at or very close to, the energy minima.

The problem with this system is that there can be trillions of similar ways for a protein to fold. Proteins can assume a very large number of conformational states, with a large number of energy minima. Despite this huge number of possible states, proteins can, within seconds, find the correct conformations and energy minima, which are also the most functional configurations.

There is, as yet, no clear indication as to how this is to be achieved. Random searching for a minimum energy conformation would take longer than the life of the universe to reach a solution. The position is not much better for supercomputers, where despite years of generous funding, it has proved impossible to calculate the minimum energy configuration for even a short chain of amino acids. This is known as the protein-folding problem. DNA encodes the primary structure of the protein, which is the sequence of the amino acids. At a secondary stage, the amino acid chains are formed into particular shapes, such as helices. At the tertiary stage, sections of helices and other shapes are brought together, and folded into a particular configuration of electric charges. It is this last stage of folding that constitutes the protein-folding problem. Satinover argues that the problem of protein folding is similar to the means, by which spin glasses reach alignment, with a huge number of axes, along which protein must flip.

Satinover explains that to achieve what they do proteins use quantum features. Some of the electrons in the protein are in a wave or superposed state, with the wave extending over a considerable distance through the protein. This is referred to as tunnelling, with the wave form of the electron able to penetrate into regions that the point-particle form of the electron cannot reach. This electron tunnelling can be exceptionally sensitive to minor couplings. In helical structures in particular, the influence of quantum tunnelling falls off only slowly with distance. The tunnelling of electrons triggers conformational changes in protein, and further to this, conformational changes in protein trigger yet more quantum tunnelling. Water is vital to living organisms, and it also exhibits tunnelling between molecules. The tunnelling process orders water into chiral (left and right-handed) clusters, which play an important role in protein folding. Tunnelling makes low-energy states more accessible within protein, and this probably proved to be an adaptive advantage, from an early stage in evolution. Studies by Peter Wolynes at the Centre of Biophysics and Computational Biology and also at the National Centre for Supercomputing Applications have simulated the tunnelling process in protein, showing that theories of spin glasses can be applied to the protein-folding problem, and also showing that tunnelling makes systems more efficient, particularly in the search for minimum energy levels. The advantage of quantum processing is that an electron can simultaneously search many routes for the most efficient route.

The existence of quantum tunnelling in protein raises the question of the vulnerability of quantum processes to decoherence. In general, the movement of molecules as a function of heat serves to disrupt quantum tunnelling. However, it is claimed that the opposite is true in the case of protein. Proteins also exhibit phonons that represent travelling, classical, mechanical coherence in protein. These are claimed to enhance tunnelling distance. This represents a mutually reinforcing relationship between classical, mechanical vibrations and quantum activity, so as to enhance short-lived coherences. Decoherence of superpositions may happen rapidly, but may collapse to just the right classical state, which also puts the protein into the right condition for the next burst of quantum coherence. Studies performed a number of years after Satinover's book look to have demonstrated just such a pattern of decline and resurgence in coherence, where quantum coherence has been demonstrated in photosynthetic proteins.

7 March 2010
FREEWILL
The anti-freewill establishment never miss a chance to emphasise the supremacy of their view. A perfectly reasonable article in the February 27 issue of 'New Scientist' about the predictability of passengers' usage of transport systems has to start with a paragraph on the theme that we think we are free spirits but we aren't. In fact, we really don't need an article in a science magazine to tell us that travel patterns are predictable - you only need to be a commuter to do that. The real point is that the bar is set much higher than many people realise for freewill denial. It does not just mean that people's actions are fairly predictable, it means that they never make a free choice at any time. The commuter as free agent never decides to get off the train one station earlier to get a cappucino or see his girl friend.

1 March 2010
THE WORLD IN YOUR HEAD - MECHANISM OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
The author, Steven Lehar makes a good case against the AI/computer model of the brain. He outlines the difficulty computers have with visual perception. Computers can detect edges, which are also the first stage in processing in the brain, but have difficulty in turning this into useful visual information. The problem is that they detect too many features, not just the edges that determine the shape and volume of objects, but a mass of less important data referring to shadows, texture etc, without the ability that biological vision has to determine the important features.

Depth and three-dimensional processing appears to be a particular problem for computers/robots, as demonstrated by the difficulty that robots find in navigating an environment of irregular objects. Lehar traces this to the fact that the retinal image in biological vision is two-dimensional, with the three dimensional depth apparently inserted as a result of cortical processing. It is argued that the brain operates a spatial algorithm, in order to produce this three-dimensional image. Computer technology does not yet appear to have matched this aspect of biological processing.

Lehar goes on to discuss a number of well-known visual examples that demonstrate the problems of a bottom-up system supposedly driven by the examination of individual visual edges. He discusses the well-known image of a Dalmatian dog against a spotty background. Much of the edges of the dog are missing, so local information does not allow the observer to distinguish the dog, but when the picture is taken as a whole, the dog is clearly distinguished. With the equally well known Kaniza triangle, there are only three PacMan figures and no interconnecting edges on the printed paper, but both edges and an area of increased whiteness are perceived by the observer. Here again there is something which cannot be created bottom up, but needs to be created by an overall view. Further to this, Lehar discusses the problem of invariant perception, by which the brain perceives an object as the same thing even though viewed from different angles and in different lights. This too cannot be understood in terms of individual edges, but needs to come from some form of global view. If it was done using individual ages there would need to be an algorithm for each possible angle of detection etc. producing a combinatorial explosion, such as would overwhelm any classical form of computing.

Lehar's attempts to explain the difference in performance between computer and biological vision in terms of Gestalt processes, which looks a bit unconvincing given that he also demonstrates, in the case of invariant perception, the enormous amount of processing needed for what the brain does. This is in fact an example of where quantum processing might be able to deal with the processing problems of the brain as conventionally understood.

22 February 2010
INDETERMINISM IN NEUROBIOLOGY
This paper is really an example of something which is all two frequent in consciousness studies, where a researcher makes an assumption about what is being proposed in quantum consciousness theories, and proceeds to attack what has been assumed without making contact with any real theories of quantum consciousness. The paper essentially addresses the wrong problem. It is mainly discussing whether the overall development of the universe and within it of large biological structures is influenced by chance events, as a result of wave function collapses at the quantum level. Unfortunately, this debate is of little interest in respect to quantum consciousness. Early on in his first book, Penrose pointed out that the randomness of the wave function collapse was of little use to mathematical understanding. It was from here that he went on to propose the idea of objective reduction, which is hypothesised to give access to the geometry of spacetime.

The paper's search for chance events in the brain is irrelevant to Penrose's and other versions of quantum consciousness theory. It adopts what is essentially the Tegmark approach to quantum coherence in biological matter, arguing that biological systems are macroscopic, interact with the environment, and by implication therefore decohere and behave in a classical/deterministic manner. This paper was written before Engel et al (2007) and Collini et al (2010) demonstrated the existence of quantum coherence in some proteins, and the latter of the two papers demonstrated coherence at room temperature. However, even when the paper was published in 2005, a discussion of Hameroff's proposals for shielding microtubule protein from decoherence would have seemed relevant.

Another unusual feature is the treatment of the possibility of chance events at the synaptic level. This is not in fact a proposition made by Penrose/Hameroff, where dendritic gap junctions are the focus of attention, but given that it is discussed, it is very surprising that Weber does not mention the fact that only 15-30% of axon potentials result in the synapse firing. However, Danko Georgiev, who is critical of the Hameroff model, has recently proposed that neurotransmitter release could be influenced by coherence extending from microtubules via presynaptic scaffold proteins.

17 February 2010
CONSCIOUSNESS: CREEPING UP ON THE HARD PROBLEM
Our latest review covers this interesting book by Jeffrey Gray, which is worth reading for a number of interesting areas of discussion. It attempts to use aspects of synaesthesia to refute functionalism. It argues that intentionality or meaning arises from unconscious processing, and also that there is no true representation of the external world in the brain. Because of these last two points, it is argued that much of the philosophical baggage of consciousness studies can be left behind, and that discussion of consciousness should be focused purely on qualia.

Gray does not think we yet have an explanation for qualia. He takes the possibility of quantum consciousness, at least in the Penrose form, more seriously than most mainstream investigators, although he argues that it contains no explanation for the selection of particular qualia. Gray's problem with Penrose looks to stem partly from the fact that he only really discusses Hameroff's ideas for implementation in the brain, rather than Penrose's original arguments for looking at the quantum level. The Penrose arguement from the Godel theorem seems to posit a direct link via wave function collapse between particular cognitive processing and the fundamental spacetime level, and this also could apply to the qualia of (mainly visual) perception discussed by Gray.

Gray sees consciousness as being selected for by evolution, because it is causal, but causal in a sense that does not involve agency or freewill. Unconscious systems are claimed to respond to conscious perception, but only in the sense that our brains can respond to a sketch as a reminder, with the sketch having no agency of its own. This part of the discussion seems rather incomplete. Gray has accepted the superficial interpretation of the Libet experiments, which ignores the possible nature of more strategic or deliberative thinking, and has relatively little to say about cognitive processing, the conscious emotional aspects of the brain, or the relationship between these two, which is known to be crucial in determining preferences for action and behaviour.

8 February 2010
QUANTUM COHERENCE IN PROTEIN AT ROOM TEMPERATURE
(under Protein&coherence 2)
A paper in the most recent copy of 'Nature' is a further step in undermining the core argument against quantum consciousness, and might one day be seen as one of the seminal papers of this century, at least for consciousness studies. Work on quantum coherence in photosynthetic proteins was pioneered by Gregory Engel, who published in 'Nature' in 2007, but this dealt with proteins at very low temperatures. He is an enthusiastic supporter of the most recent paper by Elisabetta Collini, which has demonstrated quantum coherence in photosynthetic proteins at room temperature, thus contradicting the 20th century dogma that long-range quantum coherence would decohere in biological systems too rapidly to be relevant to their systems.

The core argument against quantum consciousness relates to the speed of quantum decoherence in biological matter being too quick for coherence to be relevant to processing, particularly neural processing, in such matter. This argument has been substantially undermined by this recent paper.

The work of Collini, Engel and others has focused on the very high level of efficiency of energy transport within some photosynthetic systems, which is itself suggestive of quantum coherence being involved. The photosynthetic proteins studied here occur in low-light conditions, where efficient energy transport would be particularly advantageous. The means by which coherence is sustained in the environment of protein is uncertain, but it is thought that it may involve correlation of motion with the surrounding environment. Engel has suggested that quantum coherence allows a search for the lowest energy state of the photosynthetic complex, and the avoidance of local minima or energy traps.

Perhaps the most surprising thing, is the speed with which this development has been taken up and given prominence at a more popular level, in the form of a useful summary by Kate McAlpine in the ' New Scientist. This includes a suggestion that the work may have relevance to the development of quantum computing, and possibly suggests a change of background attitude to the implications of the coherence in protein debate. None of these papers and commentaries mentions the vexed question of quantum consciousness, but discussion of quantum computing moves us a step in that direction.

5 February 2010
IONIC WAVE PROPAGATION ALONG MICROTUBULES
Satiric and Tuszynski have produced a further model for possible quantum processing in microtubules, quite close to the suggestions of Georgiev. They propose that the charge distribution on the surface of the tubulin subcomponents of microtubules can result in a peak in electrical potential on each of the 13 protofilaments of the microtubule and a corresponding trough in the areas between. The microtubule as a whole is viewed as a 'cable' conducting 13 parallel ionic flows. The flow of ions is postulated to be mainly channelled through valleys in the electrical potential parallel to each protofilament. The model proposed here is that microtubules with brush-like 'tubulin tails' projecting from them and surrounded by solvent ions act as electrical transmission lines. It is suggested that this model could provide some insight into a role for microtubules in information processing within neurons.

05/02/2010
THE STRUCTURE OF WATER
A recent New Scientist article reexamines theories about the structure of water. Although the article itself is not at all related to theories of consciousness, it is apparent that the structure and behaviour of water, which comprises 70% of the brain, may well be relevant to quantum theories of consciousness. The key to understanding water is the interaction of its molecules. These molecules are comprised of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom to give the well known H20 formula. The oxygen atom is left with a negative charge, because only two of its eight electrons bond with the two hydrogen atoms, while the hydrogen atoms are left with a positive charge on each of their protons, after both their single electrons bond with the oxygen atom. Positive and negative charges on opposite sides of the water molecule mean that water molecules are attracted to one another by opposite charges. These bonds are known as hydrogen bonds. These are weaker than the bonds within the molecules, and are constantly breaking and reforming. Traditionally, it has been thought that each water molecule was surrounded by four neighbours arranged in the form of a triangular pyramid. However, recent work has suggested that only about 15% of water is ordered in this form, while 85% of the molecules are more disordered. Ordered structures are suggested to comprise groups of only 50 to 100 molecules, within a sea of more disordered molecules. This hypothesis is disputed, with many scientists arguing that up to 90% of water may have the more ordered structure.

04/02/10
STABLE MICROTUBULES
Another paper by Georgiev, reviewed yesterday, pursues an alternative to the Hameroff model for consciousness based in microtubules. The paper stresses the stability of microtubules in neurons relative to other cells. This is the reason that information processing and consciousness are feasible in neuron microtubules, and it gets rid of the simplistic, but often repeated refutation of Penrose, that we wouldn't just be conscious in the brain, if the theory were true. Georgiev does not think that energy for computing in microtubules could be generated in the way suggested by Hameroff and coworkers, but suggests instead a combination of the electric field and elastic energy stored in the walls of microtubules from the time at which they are assembled.

02/02/2010
PSEUDOSCEPTICISM - NO WAY TO DO SCIENCE - THE PROBLEM OF THE WORD QUANTUM
The modern use or abuse of the word 'quantum' is extremely unfortunate when it comes to trying to discuss theories of quantum consciousness. Two trends are apparent, firstly, the attachment of the word to theories, which do not attempt to establish any very rigorous basis, and may just generate a feel good factor, and secondly an indiscriminate commercial or semi-commercial use. This plays straight into the hands of those who want to confine explanations of consciousness to the classic level, and to scales not below those of a whole neuron. It also favours those who for essentially heritage reasons want to keep consciousness as the preserve of philosophy and psychology, and to shout down any involvement with physics and even at times neuroscience. This is thought to justify labeling any mention of quantum consciousness with words such as hallucinatory and 'flapdoodlery' even where it involves libeling peer-reviewed scientists. Students of consciousness need to hold onto the fact that this is no way to do science, which is based on evidence and its logical interpretation.

One answer to this approach is to apply the label 'pseudoscepticism'. Much use is made of the label 'pseudoscience' when attacking quantum consciousness theories, regardless of the fact that they made be testable proposals derived from known elements of physics and neuroscience. Pseudoscepticism is the rejection of ideas using the pretense of a science based reason, without providing any evidence or rational argument.

02/02/2010
GAMMA SYNCHRONY AND THE NEUROPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In our latest review (under General Articles 4) a paper titled 'The neurophysics of consciousness' by E. Roy John provides useful background evidence for the correlation of the gamma synchrony with consciousness, and the close involvement of thalamo-cortical loops with the gamma synchrony. The author discusses the extension of the synchrony across different modalities and specialisations in the brain, the increase of synchrony in line with selective attention, the existence of synchrony in REM, but not in deep sleep, and the decrease in synchrony as a result of anaesthetic agents.

The author seems to see the gamma synchrony and its involvement with thalamo-cortical links as a possible full answer to consciousness. However, correlation is not identity. In terms of classical physics, it is not clear how even a sychronised electrical potential could give rise to something not found in the rest of nature. For this reason, it seems more likely that the gamma synchrony and its activities in the thalamo-cortical circuits and other areas of the brain are a correlate of some underlying and possibly non-classical process.