Freewill 2

Stapp starts by taking the view that the mind/matter problem represents a conflict between classical physics and our own intuitions. In classical physics we have to be automatons, while our intuition tells us that we are in charge of our actions. The dominant paradigm in neuroscience and philosophy is based on classical physics and attempts to explain away the intuition of free will. Stapp, however, thinks it is necessary to bring in a form of quantum theory, which emphasises the importance of the observer. This yields a theory that is much closer to our intuitions. The need for a self-observing quantum system to ask particular questions produces a causal opening for mind/brain dynamics.

Classical physics was based on the concept of bits of material localised in small regions, with all of the motion of these bits of matter determined by other bits of matter. The local character of this form of physical law was a central feature. The localised bits of matter respond only to their immediate neighbours, and not at all to more distant objects. The evolution of the physical universe is governed by the totality of these local processes.

Stapp takes the view that the success of classical physics in the 18^th and 19^th centuries has dazzled modern philosophers, so that they see it as part of their role to explain away consciousness. The dominant role of philosophers in the science of consciousness is itself interesting. While philosophers may have a useful role to play in interpreting science, it is difficult to think of another scientific area, where hypothesis put forward by scientists and medical experts would be openly ridicule, without bothering to attempt any serious analysis of the ideas put forward.

Stapp reminds us that the assumptions of classical theory mentioned above are now known to be incorrect. Stapp believes that quantum theory can provide a better understanding of the mind brain problem. However, he agrees the quantum randomness is not a useful feature as it would be destructive of rational behaviour.

The original Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory was thrashed out at the Solvay Conference of 1927. It was agreed that the wave function represented our knowledge of the system, and the particle after collapse of the wave function represents a more precise knowledge of the system as a result of the measurement. Our knowledge, in this interpretation, is knowledge of a mathematical theory, and not knowledge of a real world of particles and fields. The mathematical formulas were to be seen as representing the knowledge of the human observers rather than external real events.
 
The Copenhagen Interpretation became the mainstream consensus for much of the 20^th century, but it has become less invariably accepted in recent decades, and Penrose is prominent amongst the physicists rejecting Copenhagen. Stapp, however, holds to an interpretation close to Copenhagen. The difference between Penrose and Stapp in the fundamental interpretation of quantum theory means that their concepts are essentially different, quite apart from any differences as to which brain functions are involved in quantum activities. In particular, Stapp’s theory only holds up if we accept a theory that is close to Copenhagen.

Stapp discusses the amendments to Copenhagen introduced by von Neumann. Von Neumann brought the human observer into the physical system of the quantum state. Most other efforts to amend Copenhagen sought to exclude the consciousness of the observer, which would bring the theory more closely into line with the attitude of classical physics. Despite this change by von Neumann, the basic concept of Copenhagen was retained, that is that the quantum is to do with knowledge, and reductions in the quantum wave are necessary for any increase in knowledge. There is thus a link between the reduction of the quantum wave and an increase in knowledge in the consciousness of the observer.

Stapp goes on further to discuss the role of the observer in traditional interpretations of quantum theory. The ‘Heisenberg Choice’ is Heisenberg’s 1927 idea that the observer in quantum theory chooses the questions that will be put to nature. The original Schrödinger equation does not specify where and when the question leading to reduction will come, so the question has to come from the observer.

Presumably on the basis that the Copenhagen version of quantum theory is based on our knowledge of the system, Stapp, in line with quite a large body of modern physicists, sees information as the basic currency of reality. The basic unit of information is taken to be the ‘bit’, which is the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to some question.

Stapp, drawing on studies of infants, assumes that humans have a hard-wired body-world schema. Consciously directed action is seen as a projection of this body-world schema into the future, with a corresponding representation in the brain. This body-world schema is seen as directing the unconscious brain, issuing commands for motor action and instructions for mental processing. On going questions to nature continue to be posed by the observer. This equates to the ‘Heisenberg Choice’ where the human observer has to decide what question to put to nature. In this case, it is the conscious processing in the brain that does this. Each experience leads to further updating of the system. When an action is initiated by a thought, this usually includes some monitoring of the subsequent action, to check it against the intended action. So something experienced as an intention becomes an action, the attention to which is also experienced.
 
Stapp views the deterministic unfolding of matter according to the Schrödinger equation as running parallel to the movement from intention to attention as two poles of the same quantum event. He also sees a tripartite structure being the Schrödinger equation, the Heisenberg choice of question to ask and the (Dirac) choice of answer from Nature. Stapp’s point is that only a conscious observer within the brain can ask the question and drive the quantum process. This also allows the experiental process to enter into the causal structure of the body brain. Stapp feels that some additional process is needed and the conscious observer is a perfect candidate. He sees quantum theory as informational in nature, and thus linked to increments in knowledge occurring in the brain. The increment in knowledge is seen as linked to a reduction in the quantum state, thus linking the mind to the physical world. The mind is therefore seen as entering into the physical world through the Heisenberg choice.

When the quantum state is reduced a wave that extends over an indefinite amount of space is instantaneously reduced to a tiny local region. Stapp feels that this constitutes a representation of knowledge, rather than a representation of matter. The wave before collapse is seen as a matter of potentiality or probabilities, which are themselves often conceived as ideas rather than realities. However, the quantum state pre-collapse evolves in line with the deterministic Schrödinger equation giving the state some of the properties of the physical, and creating a hybrid. Stapp opines that the evolution of the system can be significantly influenced by the choice and timing of the questions put to nature by the observer.

Stapp does not suggest that our conscious thoughts are completely unconstrained, but he does see our thoughts as a part of the causal structure of the mind-brain that is not dominated by the actions of the smallest components of the brain, but is also not a random effect. Our thoughts are seen not as linked to external objects, but instead linked to patterns of brain activity. Stapp points out that his theory has a place for an efficacious conscious mind linked to the physical processes of the brain.

In the latter part of his article, Stapp does attempt to address the problem of what happened when there were no human minds to poses questions of nature. He suggests that the dynamic of the Schrödinger evolution, which is to produce an event that replicates the event that produced it, could somehow stand in for the later action of conscious minds. On the surface of it, this does not seem very convincing, since the rest of article has been stressing the difference between the questions posed by conscious minds and their timing on their one hand and the determinism of classical physics as applied to the brain on the other hand.

The problem with Stapp’s theory and with the whole Copenhagen influenced interpretation of quantum theory is the apparent dualism. Mathematics can be seen as a mental process instantiated in protein, which cannot directly influence the external world. Somehow the mathematical description of the quantum waves is sitting out there in space and then as a result of a measurement becomes a physical object, in the form a quantum particle. The problem is really the same as with dualism. In Copenhagen a mental concept external to the body becomes physical with no explanation as to how the two could interact. In dualism, the spirit stuff and the material stuff are supposed to act on one another, but it is not clear how, without one taking on some of the characteristics of the other, at which point the system is no longer dualistic. The Copenhagen system has the additional problem of what was happening before human minds emerged, for which Stapp’s explanation appears rather sketchy.

References:-

(1) Dennett, Daniel  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind  ed Samuel Guttenplan  Blackwell

Schwartz, J.  (1999)  A role for volition and attention in the generation of new brain circuitry  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, (8-9) pp. 115-42

Stapp, Henry P. (1972)  The Copenhagen Interpretation  American Journal of Physics, 40, pp. 2098-2116

Stapp, Henry P. (1993)  Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics  Springer Verlag

Stapp, Henry P. (1998a)  Pragmatic approach to consciousness  Brain and Values ed. Karl Pribram

von Neumann, J. (1932)  The Mathematical Principles of Quantum Mechanics  Princeton University Press (1955)

Wigner, E. (1961)  The probability of existence of a self-reproducing unit  The Logic of Personal Knowledge, ed M. Polyani  Routledge & Kegan Paul

Hodgson’s article is interesting for its examination of freewill in respect of particular decisions, even if its eventual proposal for the functioning of freewill seems less convincing. The author points out that the dominant paradigm of the brain, which excludes freewill, is based on classical Newtonian physics, with possibly some allowance for quantum randomness impinging on it. Here he draws an important distinction between Newtonian physics, which is based on things that can be measured by the same standards and our motivations and opinions, where there is no precise measurement.

Hodgson examines the problem of choice and takes the example of a three way choice. In this example, he has received a windfall of $500, and he contemplates (1) Buy a new amplifier (2) Give the money to famine relief (3) Save the money (4) Spend half the money on a low quality amplifier and then give the other half to famine relief. In particular, this example is a welcome relief in that it confronts us with the sort of decision that we would normally associate with the conscious exercise of freewill, rather than obstinately insisting that any discussion of freewill should be based on the timing of trivial actions such as wrist flexing.

He feels that no verbal expression of his reasons for or against particular choices will ever by conclusive. He needs to make an effort to decide between them, but what does this effort refer to. Once he has expressed the reasons in favour of each choice, there are no further reasons for or against a particular choice, and yet the reasons are not by themselves conclusive. Yet the decision does not feel like chance, like resolving the matter by tossing a coin. There appears to be some other mental act, which does not constitute either additional reasoning or choice. He touches on the issue of what extent the outcome of a choice derives from the background that has determined his character. he accepts that this will have an important influence on the reasoning, but not to the extent of providing a precisely measurable outcome

He realises that reductionists will argue that although the reasons cannot be expressed in a conclusive way, at the unconscious level, they have weightings, which are precise and deterministic. He accepts this as possible, but considers that he has a more plausible theory.

Hodgson could be thought to be justified in a firmer rebuttal of the reductionist argument. Theoretically, it is possible to make a choice based on unconscious weightings. But this raises the question of why we make lengthy consciously reasoned choices, rather than quick unconscious decisions. From an evolutionary point of view, the time spent mulling over choices, which can be considerable, would be better spent pursuing prey or reproductive opportunities. The process is also extravagant in terms of energy, tying up brain capacity which is a notoriously energy intensive part of the body.

Having got this far with the mechanism of choice, it also seems a pity that Hodgson makes no mention of the role of the emotions. Clinical evidence shows that problems with the connection between the limbic (emotional) system and the rational/executive areas leads to severe difficulty in making decisions. If we think of situations like those described by Hodgson, it is the emotional colouring of the different possibilities is a major factor in the eventual choice. In our minds, we could imagine or test out the likely future pleasure that we would get from the improved quality of our music, and compare to feel-good factor of having given $500 to famine relief, or even possibly empathise with the improved conditions of the recipients. The result of these subjective feel-goodscenarios might well be the descisive factor, particularly as it is impossible to put an exact conscious weighting on the rational arguments.

Hodgson goes onto discuss the possible involvement of quantum mechanics in choice. He suggests that with an undecided choice the brain is put into a superposition of states. This appears similar to Stapp's top-down approach to quantum control of the brain. In fact the actual decision might be weighted by the pre-existing character of the subject, as to say 95% in favour of buying an amplifier and 5% as to giving the money away, with the final decision as a random quantum event. However, it is hard to see why evolution would ever have selected for a long-winded conscious reasoning process, when all it was getting for its expenditure was a slight randomisation of what was basically determinstic.

Hodgson does somewhat refine his initial quantum proposal by suggesting that throughout the decision process, volitional causation would be adjusting the probabilities for the outcome, so that what initially might seem the most likeley outcome might have receded immediately prior to the actual decision, while the eventual choice might only become highly probable in the latter stages of the process. This seems reasonable given that it actually approximates to our experieince of the more decision making processes, but it does little to resolve the difficulties inherent in his main proposition. Furthermore, it introduces another puzzle. He mentions that the probabilities are adjusted by volitional causation. It is not clear what exactly this volition is within Hodgson’s causation model, which only allows for determinsitic weightings plus a bit of randomness.

It is interesting that Hodgson’s description of how the reasons for different actions in a decision are not conclusive and yet there are no further reasons to be looked at, and some other process is brought into play, sounds very like the Penrose suggestion of decisions and understanding based on a non-computable process.

The article reads like a missed opportunity. The author is free from the psychology department fixation with discussing free will in terms of trivia, and the analysis of the rational side of decisions is such as to put the reductionists on the spot, but this does not carry through to the production of a particularly interesting theory of freewill.

References:-

Hodgson, D. (1991)  The Mind Matters  Oxford University Press

Hodgson, D. (1996)  Folk psychology, science and the criminal law  Science and Consciousness Conference, Tucson, Arizona

Lockwood, M (1991) Review of ‘The Mind Matters  Times Literary Supplement

Nagel, T (1986)  The View from Nowhere  Oxford University Press

Searle identifies two main approaches to identifying the basis of consciousness. First, there is the building-block approach. The conscious field is viewed as a series of conscious experiences or building blocks of consciousness, and if just one of these, such as how we experience the colour red was explained, this would explain the whole thing, because the other experiences would probably be based on the same mechanism. The way to find this mechanism would be through the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for an individual experience.
 
At some stage, supporters of this views hope to identify some NCC thatis not just an NCC but also a causal mechanism. However, this approach has not registered much progress in terms of scientific observation or testing since the modern consciousness debate started. Searle thinks it may be the wrong approach. He prefers what he calls the unified approach. He thinks of the conscious field as a unity that is modified by the individual experiences. At the same time, he sees the distinction between the conscious and unconscious areas of the brain as the possible key to the problem.

Searle makes a distinction between the qualitative character of experiences or sensations and the qualitative character of voluntary actions. Humans are passive recipients of perceptions and have no choice in the matter of registering sensations. On the other hand, with voluntary actions, we experience an effort in causing a bodily movement.

In common with some other commentators, Searle points out that with a voluntary decision the reasons for the action are not sufficient to cause the action. In addition, the subject has to decide, to make up their mind to take the action. This is particularly so when there are strongly conflicting for or against reasons. The reasons are not causally sufficient to produce the actions. There is a gap between reasons and action that has often been explained in terms of the action of freewill. Where we are involved in longer term projects, for instance writing an article, as opposed to a single voluntary action, we experience the need for a persistent effort of will to keep going. Moreover, the gap cannot be explained by positing an element of randomness in the proceedings, because the agent is acting in relation to the reasons and the action is often seen as purposeful.. What is involved is the sort of consciousness, wilful consciousness that comes into play when there is just this gap between reasons and action. Searle thinks this requires the involvement of a self that is more than just a bundle of perceptions. There is a need to explain why one rather than another action was performed.

The standard causal explanation is A causes B. But where a rational agent is involved it goes, self, S did act, A, because it was acting on reason R.

In summary, Searle is claiming that consciousness is a unified field, and that it requires us to postulate a self that is not part of the field, but requires the field in order to function.

Searle says that we experience our own voluntary actions in such a way that we are aware of alternative possibilities being open to us, and that the existing reasons for action or psychological antecedents are not sufficient in themselves to decide the action.

The mainstream view of freewill is called ‘compatibilism’. This states that to say that an event is free is to say that it is determined by certain kinds of causes. Searle does not find this to be a useful explanation of freewill, because he does not see the reasons as sufficient to determine the actions.

Searle also considers that the idea that the apparent process of rational decision taking has no effect is an incredible proposition from the point of evolutionary theory, because it would mean that a biologically expensive brain system had no survival advantage for the organism. Therefore Evolution would tend to work to eliminate such a feature, even if did happen to arise through mutations.

Searle views consciousness as a systems feature, relevant to all levels of the brain. He thinks that to make sense of free conscious action, we have to postulate a self, which in turn only makes sense relative to a unified conscious field. He thinks that consciousness can have influence downwards to the levels of the neurons. He also takes the view that in the case of the experiments of Deecke, Kornhuber, Scheid and Libet^(1-2) the readiness potential is not causally sufficient for the subsequent action. Searle takes the view that the subject has consciously decided to make the requested wrist or finger movement, and is preparing for such a movement before the readiness potential appears in the unconscious brain. Thus the unconscious readiness potential is not sufficient by itself. Searle thinks that consciousness as a feature of the whole system can explain the operation of volition.

In the end, Searle’s argument amounts to something of an anti-climax and is low on explanatory power. Although he argues effectively against some of the mainstream doctrines, particularly in respect of the need for freewill, his suggestion that consciousness is a feature of the whole system is disappointingly vague, with still no indication of how the brain is supposed to generate the property of consciousness, not found elsewhere in the universe. As for freewill, Searle admits that he is stating the problem rather than the solution.

References:-

(1)  Deecke, L. Scheid, P. & Kornhuber, H. (1969)  Readiness potential preceding voluntary finger movement  Experimental Brain Research, 7, pp. 158-68

(2)  Libet, B. (1999)  Do we have free will?  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 (8-9) pp. 47-57

Nagel, T. (1986)  The View from Nowhere  Oxford University Press

Searle, J. (1983)  Intentionality  Cambridge University Press

Searle, J. (1984)  Minds, Brains and Science  Harvard University Press

Searle, J. (1992)  Rediscovery of the Mind  MIT Press

Searle, J. (1997)  The Mystery of Consciousness

Searle, J. (2000)  Consciousness  Annual Review of Neuroscience 2000, vol 23, pp. 557-78

Searle, J.  Mind , Brain and Humansit Values  in New Views of the Nature of Man  ed John Plant  University of Chicago Press