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Mainstream 8MAINSTREAM 8 Summaries and reviews of papers, articles and books relative to mainstream theories of consciousness 1.) Ghosts in the Machine - Steven Pinker - Pinker surprises by adopting the new mysterian view that we are incapable of understanding consciousness, despite insisting that it does not depend on anything outside classical physics. Assertions relative to what Penrose said are incorrect. 2.) Roger Penrose's Gravitronic Brains - Hans Moravec - Unconvincing critique of Penrose's interpretation of the Godel theorem 3.) The Myth of Quantum Consciousness - Victor Stenger - A short piece demonstrating how main stream comment can often miss the whole point about quantum consciousness Ghosts in the Machine Steven Pinker Cosmos - Feb/March 2007 Pinker starts his article by sketching his definition of consciousness. Consciousness is life itself, and the conviction that other people suffer or flourish is the essence of empathy and the foundation of morality. Pinker discounts the once fashionable notion that consciousness depends on language, pointing to both infants and brain damaged patients, who have lost the power of speech or of comprehension of speech but appear to remain conscious. Consciousness is also said to be different from self-awareness, in that one can lose oneself in music or other sensory pleasures. He might also have said that in many examples of altered states of consciousness the self is felt to have disappeared, although there is still something that observes. Pinker agrees with Chalmers that the hard problem is to determine why it feels like something to have conscious processes in one’s brain, and why we have qualia, such as the experience of the colour green. The hard problem is to explain how subjective experience arises from the computational processing of the brain. Pinker stresses the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes He is sympathetic to Bernard Baar’s idea of a global workspace in which the focus of attention and the working memory represent an ‘executive summary’ selected from an otherwise overwhelming flood of data into the brain. Unusually for recent commentators, Pinker sees consciousness as depending on ‘certain frequencies of oscillation’ in the EEGs between the cortex and the thalamus, and although not mentioned as such, this would usually refer to the 40Hz or gamma synchrony. This is suggested to solve the binding problem, by tying together activity in different parts of the cortex. Pinker takes the interesting example of studies of two eyes competing in binocular rivalry, in which neurons related to the ‘winning’ eye oscillate in synchrony, while those related to the ‘losing’ eye fall out of synchrony. Elsewhere, Pinker refers favourably to the consciousness work of Crick and Koch, seemingly unaware that it was they who first widely publicised the gamma synchrony, but then subsequently encouraged the mainstream to downplay the idea, once it was discovered that the synchrony related to activity in the dendrites rather than action potentials. As a result, some modern discussions of consciousness now ignore the gamma synchrony altogether. Pinker admits that features such as the gamma synchrony are only correlates of consciousness, and as such they are only part of the ‘easy problems’ of consciousness, and still do not tell us how or why subjective consciousness is produced. As in much consciousness writing, a good start is followed by a tailing off in the quality of discussion. Some of the latter part of the article might be felt to be wasted in descriptions of psychological experiments that show the brain produce illusions as to what it is perceiving and as to the freedom of its actions. There seem to be two points to make about these experiments. In the first place, they produce highly contrived and artificial situations that are most unlikely to have arisen in the hunter-gathering life that we evolved to cope with, and where we would have been unlikely to have survived as a species, if we were really that prone to illusions. The other point is that even if we are so illusion ridden, we still have to be conscious to experience the illusions, so this doesn’t get us any nearer to a discovering the basis of consciousness. In the end, Pinker has little joy in trying to wrap up the final part of his article. Dennett’s position is too much for him. Reducing consciousness to, or identifying it with information processing and nothing more, seems to him to amount to the denial of the undeniable fact that we experience consciousness. His reference to quantum consciousness is both brief and incorrect. He appears to suggest that it was Roger Penrose who advanced the opinion that because quantum theory was weird, and consciousness was weird, the two might be connected. In fact, this was a criticism or rather mockery concocted by opponents of quantum consciousness, which is here quite wrongly passed off as if they were Penrose’s core argument. The comment here probably arises from Pinker’s ignorance of quantum consciousness theories, but it is nevertheless the sort of sleight of hand that is all too common in consciousness studies. Pinker, perhaps surprises by not going for the mainstream take on consciousness, which is that continuing research will disclose a basis for consciousness broadly supportive of functionalism or identity theory. Instead, he plumps for the ‘new mysterian’ approach, although he doesn’t give it that name. This view has been championed by Colin McGinn of the University of Miami, who argues that it is beyond the ability of brains evolved from those of apes, and honed to hunter-gathering, to grasp the nature of subjective consciousness. There is a certain intuitive attraction to this view, in that we sense something ineffable, when we try to relate consciousness to the physical world. However, the new mysterian view looks to be much more compatible with either a dualist/spirit stuff or a quantum view of consciousness, than it is with Pinker’s mainstream materialism. It is quite plausible that ape brains might not grasp the nature of a spirit, and it is certainly true that they struggle with the acausal randomness and non-locality of quantum theory. What is implausible, given the impressive structure of scientific knowledge built up by the ape brains over the last 400 years, is that these brains cannot grasp the nature of a consciousness that can be described by classical physics and which depends on the conventional brain mechanics of electrical potentials and amino-acids. PENROSE'S GRAVITONIC BRAINS Hans Moravec Robotics Institute Carnegie Institute University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au Albert Imperator (AI) (really Penrose in this context), the inventor of an advanced robot and the robot itself discuss an algorithm by which the society of advanced robots, known as SMIRC, certifies mathematical proofs. The Gödel sentence for this algorithm is called Omega(Q*), and it is constructed from the society’s algorithm. It means that SMIRC’s algorithm certifies a particular statement. The robot asserts that SMIRC never makes mistakes. However, if SMIRC certifies the Gödel sentence, it makes the Gödel sentence false, thus creating a paradox. Humans can use their understanding to see that the Gödel sentence is true, but neither humans nor SMIRC can certify it as proved, without creating a paradox. Hans Moravec of the Robotics Institute at Carnegie Mellon University claims that incongruities in Penrose’s argument are expressed in a subsequent spoof discussion between Penrose and the robot. Following on Penrose’s claim that only human mathematical understanding and not SMIRC certification can cope with the Gödel sentence, Moravec kicks off his dialogue with a classic error that dogs much discussion regarding the ability of consciousness to arise from classical computation. This is the notion that opponents of classical computer based consciousness are proposing some form of competition between human brains and computers. The opponents are supposed to be claiming that human brains are superior in a direct one-to-one comparison, whereas what they are actually saying is that while computers are superior in many respects, and will become more so in the future, human brains are different, in that they give rise to consciousness and certain types of understanding. Moravec’s next step is to compare, what is here claimed to be Penrose’s defence of, as it is quaintly put, ‘a viscerally attractive position’ with Wilberforce’s defence of, what we now call Creationism, against Darwin. The strange thing about this is that it does not occur to Moravec that the comparison would fit a lot better, if he was himself in the role of Wilberforce, and it was Penrose who was in the role of Darwin. It is Moravec that is defending the established orthodoxy, whilst it is Penrose that is proposing a controversial new theory. Nor is it a valid argument, to try and make a distinction between religious and scientific orthodoxy, since Kelvin, one of the leading physicists of his day, opposed Darwin, on what were according to the knowledge of that time entirely reasonable grounds. Perhaps aware that the Wilberforce argument is not entirely convincing, Moravec moves on to the ‘science by popular vote stratagem’. The logic and neurobiological communities rejected Penrose’s proposals. Well, science depends on observation, experiment and reasoned interpretation, not on ‘Pop Idol’ type votes. The rejection by these communities sounds impressive, as if numerous mighty minds had toiled through the night preparing different reasoned refutations, but reading the reality gives more the impression of a knee jerk reaction (one for each community) from those assured of certain certainties. The logic community, closely allied to artificial intelligence, refuses to contemplate anything beyond the classical computer, which only goes to remind us that each age from ancient Greece onwards has compared the mind to the most recent technology. As for the neurobiological community, it remains stuck with the neuron as the one fundamental unit, perhaps because until a generation ago, technology prevented much observation below that level. Writing in 1995, Moravec goes on to predict how the exponential growth of computing power will lead to the displacement of human intellectual and physical labour by capable machines. Others like him in the later 1990s produced predictions of how machines would displace and even rule humans by the first few years of the 21st century. The first part of Moravec’s prediction is true. Computer power has continued to grow rapidly over the intervening 13 years. Computers are more capable, but artificial intelligence is stuck in the same rut as it was during all the latter decades of the last century. Although they would be in great demand, there is no significant signs of the type of autonomous robots that could perform household chores, or look after old people and children. Even in more strictly intellectual areas, there are few who would grant them the type of understanding needed to make policy or strategic decisions. The establishment is still bound to the primacy of the classical computer, but for those with eyes to see, it is apparent that the algorithm for common sense and meaning is lacking, at least for classical computers. It is only on page three of his ‘dialogue’ that Moravec begins to get down to serious logic chopping. In a rather crude approach, he tries to overwhelm the Penrose argument. His robot now has such a powerful brain that its programmes and Gödel sentences are too large for Penrose to read. Even in this rather slanted dialogue, Penrose is allowed to mention that according to his own theory, however large the robot programme or Gödel sentences, the human brain still has an understanding that is lacking in the robot brain. In reply, Moravec launches off into what amounts to an ungrounded speculation about the future greatness of robot brains, and in particular anticipates the modern fashion for a multiverse, in which robots are able to realise Gödel sentences that are true in some realities but not in others. The reality, or rather lack of it, of modern AI, should perhaps be seen as a bench mark for the plausibility of what Moravec’s robot tries to claim. THE MYTH OF QUANTUM CONSCIOUSNESS VICTOR STENGER The Humanist, May/June 1992, No. 3, pp. 13-15 In jumping straight to the idea of quantum consciousness as a myth, Stenger’s article starts by assuming what it sets out to prove, a bad but not uncommon fault. However, much worse is to follow. Modern ideas of quantum consciousness have been developed by senior scientists, sometimes in considerable technical detail, as in the cases of Penrose, and quantum brain dynamics. But Stenger is having none of this, and in fact mentions only one of the main theories of quantum consciousness in his article, and even this involves a serious conceptual error. Instead, he dives off into vague aspersions relative to New Age, metaphysics and Makarishi Mahesh Yogi. Further to this, he makes the assertion that the quantum consciousness myth derives it force from the inability to accept the insignificance of humans in the modern universe. This question is not regarded as important in any of the main theories of quantum consciousness. Not content with this, he suggests that the idea is the product of ‘self gratification that has reached heights never dreamt of in ancient Rome.’ On the third page, Stenger makes the extraordinary claim that a suggestion by Newton that the brain might cause vibrations of the ether is the conceptual foundation of quantum consciousness. Needless to say, nothing like this claim appears in any of the main theories of quantum consciousness. From here, Stenger diverts into the sad and rambling tale of Oliver Lodge, an early 20th century physicist who tried to use mediums to communicate with a dead son. Lodge seems to have had an idea that this communication might involve radio waves. Again this idea doesn’t bear the slightest resemblance to any modern quantum consciousness ideas, and it is not clear why this unhappy story has been dragged in, except perhaps in the hope of discrediting by association. Only well into the second half of the article does Stenger start to discuss quantum physics, and this is the only time that he mentions any of the main quantum consciousness proponents, in the form of David Bohm. Stenger states correctly that Bell’s Theorem and the subsequent Aspect type experiments since 1982 disproved Bohm’s idea that quantum physics was deterministic, as a result of so-called ‘hidden variables’. What Stenger fails to mention is that Bohm’s ideas about consciousness are not linked to the hidden variable hypothesis. Bohm noted that quantum theory and relativity theory, the two most fundamental theories of physics are incompatible, and suggested that this was resolved at a deeper physical level, which he called the implicate order. Consciousness was suggested to arise at this level. The article peters out with a rambling discussion of quantum theory, which is mainly concerned with insisting that it proves the impossibility of faster than light motion. However, none of the main proponents of quantum consciousness are contesting this widely accepted principle, so what is the point of this last part of the article? It might be questioned as to why it is worth discussing an article that is so far adrift from any of the main quantum consciousness proposals. The real point that is being made here is the extent to which confidence in the wrongness of quantum consciousness theories allows all sorts of material to be written without any apparent need to check the facts. |
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