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Nicholas Humphrey - Soul Dust
Soul
Dust
Nicholas Humphrey
The substance of this book falls into two parts, an attempt to explain
how consciousness arises and an attempt to understand the functions of consciousness,
working from the basis that evolution must have selected for it.
The
explanation of how consciousness arises rests on feedback loops. These are
widespread in the brain, and according to this theory, lead on to dynamic
activity in the form of the kind of attractor basins found in chaos theory.
Humphrey's is not the first to suggest there might be chaos theory aspects to
neural processing, with small differences in initial conditions leading to big
differences and also repetitive patterns (attractor basins) in the eventual
outcome. As such this does not seem out of tune with either the 'run away' or
the repeating aspects of some cognitive and emotional processing.
However, what
is difficult to see is how this gives process rise to consciousness. Chaos
theory originally became established as a result of observing weather systems.
In fact the classic example of a small difference in initial conditions leading
to a major difference in outcome is still that the movement of the wings of a
butterfly in China leading to a tornado or similar in the US. From weather, the
theory was extended to other systems such as turbulence in water and even to
financial markets. What is noticeable however is that none of these systems is
suggested to be conscious, and there is no clarification as to why a chaotic
system in biological matter should be conscious either.
The larger part of
the book is spent discussing the functions of consciousness as a justification
as to why evolution selected for consciousness. The main suggestion is that
consciousness conveys a pleasure in living that incentives us towards survival.
Arguably the most interesting moments in this book are examples of what looks
like pleasure in life in non-human animals. P. I think there's something to be
said for the pleasure in living idea. It might have benefited from being
connected to evidence for emotional evaluation of perceptions and their part in
subsequent behaviour. This would allow the idea to be extended beyond just
pleasure in living to a more general adaptiveness for subjective experience.
Unfortunately the merits of the pleasure in
life idea are rather dissipated by a contradiction that emerges at a slightly
later stage. The incentive to go on living appears to be ascribed a causal role
in keeping us alive, which is why evolution selected for it. However, only a
bit later we are told that as scientists, we support a Libet-style
deterministic view of all actions without apparently any role for
consciousness, taking pleasure in living or otherwise. The author does not
discuss the apparent contradiction, nor the problem that the claimed science is
based on trivial rather than more deliberative actions.
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