Other Quantum 4

Other quantum and related theories of consciousness

1.) The CEMI Field Theory - Johnjoe McFadden

2.) How many people are there in my head And in hers? - Jonathan Edwards - Consciousness theory based on individual neurons and waves in classical physics

3.) Falsification of Penrose-Hameroff model of consciousness & novel avenues for development of quantum mind theory - Danko Georgiev, Laboratory of Molecular Pharmacology, University of Kanazawa - A hybrid theory accepting Penrose's objective reduction, but rejecting Hameroff's model in favour of Bose-Einstein condensates lasting only 10-15 picoseconds.

4.) Analysis of quantum decoherence in the brain
& Solotonic effect of the local electromagnetic field on neuronal microtubules - Danko Georgiev et al - Mechanism for implementing quantum coherence based consciousness in neurons

5.) Electric and magnetic fields inside neurons and their impact upon the cytoskeletal microtubules - Danko Georgiev - Further on microtubule based quantum information processing

1.)

The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (CEMI) Field Theory

Johnjoe McFadden, University of Surrey

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 8, 2002, pp. 45-60

The author's core claim is that consciousness is the component of the brain's electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neurons, and thus communicates its information content to the outside world. He considers that field theories of consciousness are attractive, because they provide a solution to the binding problem. He thinks that the brain demonstrates an electromagnetic field that influences brain function through voltage-gated ion channels that are sensitive to the electromagnetic field. Information flows from neurons into the electromagnetic field and from there, in more integrated form, back into the neurons. He sees this as a physical sub-strata of consciousness, with the will proceeding from the electromagnetic field to the neurons. It is suggested that this processing in the electromagnetic field provides an evolutionary advantage. The field is experienced as consciousness, and is able to handle such concepts as self, meaning and number. It is suggested that such concepts can only be processed holistically. The information is communicated to the outside world via motor neurons, and only the part of the field related to the motor neurons is conscious. This includes memory, which may later be reported via the motor neurons, and only part of the field related to motor neurons is conscious. The rest of the electromagnetic field is not related to reportable information, and in the theory it is divorced from consciousness. The conscious component of the electromagnetic field is defined as that information that is downloaded to the motor neurons. The rest of the field is seen as unavailable to introspection, and therefore to reportable consciousness.

McFadden attempts to answer critics, who say that the CEMI theory does not really solve the hard problem of consciousness. The author feels that information needs to be encoded within a physical substrata, and that the nature of the substrata is the fundamental question about consciousness. The author points out that in an electrical circuit signals are transmitted at the speed of the field, rather than the speed of the individual electrons. So a computer is encoded by electromagnetic waves rather than by particles. Neuronal signals involve the movements of of ions rather than electrons. The information cannot be encoded in the ions, which move perpendicular to the cell membrane, and therefore not in the necessary direction for the information flow of the neuron. The information carrier in the neuron is the action potential, here viewed as an electromagnetic field. The author argues that even if we see consciousness as a property of electrons, the electromagnetic field still has to be the substrata of consciousness. He argues that conscious experience is complex information encoding what an electromagnetic field feels like from the inside.

CONCLUSION: The reader is left with a slightly ungrounded feel in the CEMI theory. McFadden doesn't seem to sufficiently discuss why consciousness should arise from the electromagnetic field. The assumption has to be that it is fundamental property of the electromagnetic field from the beginning of the universe that the brain is able to tap into. The attraction of quantum consciousness theories is that the quantum level is the repository of given properties of the universe such as mass, charge and spin, and that consciousness, which cannot be adequately explained as a product of the interaction of physical particles, could be understood as such a given property. Further to this, confining consciousness to the function of the motor neurons seems idiosyncratic given evidence for conscious experience arising in a range of brain regions.

References:-

1.) McFadden, J. (2002) - Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain's electromagnetic field - Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (4), pp. 23-50

2.) McFadden, J. (2000) - Quantum Evolution - Harper Collins

2.)

How many people are there in my head And in hers?

Jonathan Edwards, Imprint Academic

INTRODUCTION: The author has painstakingly researched and developed his own theory of consciousness. He argues firstly, that consciousness has to exist at the level of the individual neuron, and secondly that this neuron-based consciousness is an electromechanical wave of elasticity in the membrane of the neuron. The wave is classical rather than quantum, which may be felt to leave unanswered the problem of how consciousness would suddenly arise at the complex level, when it does not exist at the fundamental level, especially given that the author is himself dismissive of emergent property theories.

In this book, qualia or subjective experiences are considered to be more than just access to information. The author refers to the philosopher, Bertrand Russell, who pointed out that 19^th and early 20^th century neuroscience and physics failed to explain subjective experience. Edwards himself remarks that in contrast to its general reputation for scientific development, the 20^th century may have been one of the least imaginative periods in history for dealing with some fundamental problems, such as consciousness. He also claims that the more we have discovered about the brain, the more difficult it seems to be to answer questions about consciousness.

In discussing the question of computers and consciousness, the author sees any understanding in the computer as ultimately dependent on an external mind, in contrast to the self-generating nature of the human brain. A computer is likened here to a system that sends out millions of Christmas cards that are either black or white (0 or 1, on or off). An external observer of the computer's mailings could work out the pattern, but the computer's own operation is just the end product of lots of on/off switches. Only the designer or an external observer of the mailings has the knowledge of the black and white Christmas card sequence. Some argue that the black and white pattern is the overall property of the system, but Edwards argues that this assumes a knowledge of the extent of the information system, which is also not a property of the on/off chain of the computer.

The working unit of a computer is a logic gate, at which two signals arrive, and one signal leaves. Signals can be either on or off. There are two types of logic gate, an AND gate and an OR gate. For a signal to come out of an AND gate, both incoming signals have to be on. With an OR gate, a signal comes out, if just one incoming signal is on. However, the brain does not work like this. In the computer/brain analogy, the neuron is analogous to a logic gate, but it is something of an open question as to how many and what type of incoming signals are needed to get an outgoing action potential. Edwards sees this process as one of integration. He envisages a short period of time, in which all the elements input into the neuron are present, and the number of these could run into tens-of-thousands. Over a period of a second, the number of elements presented to the neuron could run into millions. The author sees this richness of input as a possible basis for consciousness, in contrast to the relative poverty of the on/off computer system.

Before microscopes were available, it seemed quite reasonable to speculate about a seat for consciousness in the brain, but this is much less plausible now. The more detailed the description of the brain becomes, the less places there are for unexplained properties to hide. The author argues that qualia, such as colour or taste, are not properties of the objects that they are related to, but arise from interactions within the brain. He further points out that these interactions are at the level of individual cells or their synapses, and not on any larger scale.

There is also the binding problem, the problem of how in consciousness, we are aware of qualia from different modalities such as vision, hearing and taste, all at the same time. The author is critical of some mainstream approaches that say that binding is 'just' a property of the system, both because it is a cop out, not offering the normal scientific explanation of a mechanism, by which things are done, and because we know that there are connections throughout the brain, which in turn suggests that there is a mechanism there, rather than a magical 'just so' arrangement. Edwards criticises the idea of talking about whole systems in relation to consciousness, suggesting that it is just a convenient short-hand way of describing something, rather than a description of a causal process. He looks for a causal process that moves through matter, such as an electromechanical wave, rather than a property that is rather mysteriously possessed by a whole system, for no particular causal reason.

Edwards argues that the individual neuron that can be receiving up to a thousand inputs from other cells has to be the basis of consciousness, because this is the only point at which input enters the brain system. Thus the only way that the author can see, for solving the problem of how millions of cells give the same answer, is for each single neuron to be a point at which the pattern of external information enters the brain. The cell membrane is central to the author's concept. He thinks it reasonable to assume that waves related to consciousness will operate in or around the cell membrane, because this is already known to be involved with information processing.

Edwards is also critical of the idea that the synchronisation of the electrical firing of cells could be the basis of consciousness. He argues that each cell is firing separately and their messages are targeted at particular cells, so there is no explanation here of how the whole system could come together to provide a sensory experience. Edwards thinks it has to be viewed the other way round, with consciousness coming up from the neuron level, and the brain viewed as a colony of conscious neurons. This argument appears sound as far as it goes, but I feel that it does not do justice to the synchronisation question. Some commentators argue that while it is not clear how synchrony could generate consciousness, studies nevertheless suggest that synchronicity is at least correlated with conscious experiences, and in this situation, it appears to be sensible to look for some form of physical connection between consciousness and synchrony.

Edwards views the cell as a good place for grasping a pattern, because a pattern is something that is available all at once, rather than as a string of elements. In common with Penrose, the author remarks on the complex abilities of the single-cell paramecium, suggestive of the possibility that a single cell could be complex enough to support awareness. Edwards accepts that it could be argued that a neuron is not a single place either, because it comprises a complex structure of dendrites and other components. However, he thinks there is an answer to this, in terms of the property of waves, in this case waves in classical rather than quantum physics.

He points out that everything in physics including classical physics comes in waves, so it would not be surprising, if waves were important to neurons, or even that consciousness itself was a wave. Waves are patterns of change in the physical world. Even for the purposes of classical physics, he views waves as not really made of anything, but as a packet of instructions for the likelihood of finding something in a particular place. An x-ray passing through the crystal structure of a protein splits into a complicated pattern that provides information about the molecular structure of the protein. The wave can be viewed as a single thing, but after passing through a crystal lattice, this single thing encodes information about the crystal lattice it has passed through.

The author is particularly interested in phonons which are the quanta or waves of elasticity in matter. His example is the chiming of a bell, where the sound is the product of an elastic pattern of change in the metal of the bell. Thus, the well-ordered structure of the bell has a dominant wave mode. Edwards relates this to a dominant mode of oscillation in the brain. The wave can be clear and dominant, because the domain has a well-ordered structure, and a clear boundary keeping the dominant mode within that particular boundary. The local force of the elastic field is considered suitable, because it is a local property of a defined piece of matter. The author sees this as compatible with the idea that consciousness is closed or private, in that the subjective feel of our own consciousness cannot be directly communicated to others.

The integration of the electrical signals coming into the cell through its dendrites is viewed as being to do with waves. The incoming signals are known as post-synaptic potentials (PSPs). The fine details of how the incoming signals interact in the membrane are still unclear. It is now thought not to be a matter of simply adding up the incoming signals. Other factors are involved. A proportion of the inputs into the cell are inhibitory rather than excitatory, and the position of the incoming signal on the dendritic tree could also influence the outcome. Studies in recent years suggest that the firing of the axon depends not so much on the totalling up of inputs as on their pattern. Edwards makes an analogy between the situation needed to trigger an action potential, and a 'flush', or series of cards in poker, as distinct from a simple process of addition.

The author carefully examines the various types of waves that might support the elasticity wave that he envisages as the basis of consciousness. Waves can involve the transduction of one form of energy into another, including transduction into the elasticity of a solid. Andrew Huxley himself did not think that the Hodgkin and Huxley wave that describes both axon potentials and post-synaptic potentials was a suitable candidate for this sort of elasticity wave. In general, these oscillations are not thought to be extensive enough to create the elasticity wave that the author is looking for. The author also discusses the ideas of Herbert Frohlich, who suggested the possibility that cell membranes might support a high-frequency electromechanical oscillation. Frohlich, hypothesised that the voltage difference across the membrane could alter its elastic potential energy. The author's main reservation concerning the Frohlich scheme is that it has remained largely untested.

Edwards is more attracted to a larger, slower type of electromechanical wave that has been detected in living cells, by Alexander Petrov and others since the late 1990s. Petrov's form of wave resembles the oscillation of the top of a drum, with molecules on either side of the membrane becoming more tightly or more loosely packed, as a result of the oscillation. This is referred to as piezoelectricity or flexoelectricity. The author thinks it possible that this may prove fundamental to the way in which living cells interact with their environment. It is suggested that the Petrov-type wave is coupled with the Huxley and Hodgkin post-synaptic wave, and that in this form the Pretrov wave could occupy the whole of the dendritic tree of the neuron, and regulate the interaction of the post-synaptic potential.

3.)

Falsification of Penrose-Hameroff model of consciousness & novel avenues for development of quantum mind theory

Danko Georgiev, Laboratory of Molecular Pharmacology, University of Kanazawa (2006)

INTRODUCTION: Georgiev thinks that consciousness could be related to Penrose's objective reduction (OR), but is critical of the Hameroff model for how Orch OR could occur in the brain. Instead, he proposes that the cytosol could support Bose-Einstein condensates on a timescale of 10-15 picoseconds, which he regards as sufficient for neural processing.

Danko Georgiev is unusual among critics of the Penrose-Hameroff theory in attacking Hameroff on his own ground, in terms of the detailed functioning of neurons. One of Georgiev's main targets is Hameroff's proposals for quantum tunnelling via gap junctions between neurons. Hameroff has suggested this, as a means by which quantum coherence could extend from one neuron to many, and thus lie behind the gamma synchrony that can extend over large segments of the brain, and is recognised in conventional theories as a correlate of consciousness.

Georgiev faults the Hameroff model on gap junctions, because it relies on structures called dendritic lamellar bodies (DLBs), to communicate between the microtubules and the gap junctions. Georgiev points to a paper by De Zeeuw et al (1995), in which it was shown that the DLBs are not present in dendritic spines, and do not come closer than some tens of micrometres to gap junctions. However, DLBs are thought to be involved in gap junction synthesis. In his paper, De Zeeuw says that DLBs contain neither microtubules nor neurofilaments, but beyond this neither Georgiev nor De Zeeuw offer a description of what lies between the DLBs and the gap junctions. This seems to leave the question of what processes this area could support rather open.

Georgiev is not trying to refute the idea of quantum coherence extending between neurons, but instead advances the view that there is quantum coherence between neurons via actin filaments and other cytoskeletal proteins at the dendritic spines. Georgiev also cites a paper by Hatori et al (2001) suggesting that actin uses quantum coherence in the movement of muscles.

Georgiev dislikes Hameroff's emphasis on conscious processing as being concentrated in the dendrites. He claims that Hameroff's does not allow any consciousness in axons, and this creates a problem in explaining the problematic firing of synapses; only 15-30% of axon spikes result in a synapse firing, and it is not clear what determines whether or not a synapse fires. It is certainly true that Hameroff emphasises the dendrites, particularly as they are important for linking to the gamma synchrony, but I have not found anything in Orch OR that specifically denies the possibility of conscious activity in the axons.

Georgiev places considerable emphasis on the fact that it is experimentally shown that the insertion of electrodes into the brain can stimulate both conscious experience and motor action. He criticises the existing Hameroff theory for failing to integrate this form of electric current, although Georgiev does not feel that it invalidates the theory as such. Georgiev says that microtubules are likley to be, and need to be, sensitive to the external electric field, if something like the Orch OR theory is to be sustained.

Georgiev criticises Hameroff's requirement for microtubules to be quantum coherent for 25 ms. This has been generally regarded as an ambitious timescale for quantum coherence, and Georgiev objects on the grounds that enzymatric functions in proteins take place on a very much quicker 10-15 picosecond timescale He suggests that vital processes might be interrupted by Hameroff's lengthy coherence period.

Georgiev wants to base his version of OR consciousness on a 10-15 picosecond timescale. He claims that modelling of the cytosol suggests that Bose-Einstein condensates could be sustained for 10-15 picoseconds, which he considers long enough for them for them to be significant in neural processing. Such a rapid form of objective reduction would also remove the necessity for the gel-sol cycle to screen microtubules from decoherence, as it does in the Hameroff version of objective reduction.

Georgiev is also critical of the standard reutation of quantum mind theories, which involves coupling a quantum state to a thermal equilibrium bath in which it will decohere. Georgiev points out that living systems are far from thermal equilibrium, and this fact invalidates this traditional critique. Georgiev suggests that consciousness is a GHz phenomenon. This, once again, has the advantage of by-passing Tegmark's time to decoherence objection by using a timescale faster than his collapse time.

4.)

Analysis of quantum decoherence in the brain
& Solotonic effect of the local electromagnetic field on neuronal microtubules

Danko Georgiev et al, Medical University of Varna/Kanazawa University

Published in Neuroquantology

INTRODUCTION: Georgiev is one of the few researchers actively investigating consciousness on the basis of quantum activity in neurons. He disagrees with Hameroff's model in a number of respects, including the function of gap junctions relative to the binding of consciousness, and instead proposes a mechanism based on quantum brain dynamics ideas, as developed by Jibu and Yasue and also Vitiello. However, despite rejecting Hameroff's mechanism, he still appears to rely on Penrose's idea of objective reduction of macroscopic quantum coherence giving access to consciousness at the fundamental spacetime level. His approach has the advantage of not requiring quantum coherence to be sustained for longer than Tegmark's calculated 10^-13 period for the collapse of quantum coherence within the brain, but having rejected Hameroff's scheme, he does not provide an alternative means of binding together the action of billions of neurons into the unified experience of consciousness.

The development of molecular biology during the latter part of the 20th century made it clear that neurons were highly complex, and from this it became apparent that features such as memory and some diseases such as dementias might be better understood in terms of molecular changes within the neurons. In these cases, it has been shown that not only are there changes in neuronal firing, but also in cytoskeletal organisation, the cytoskeleton being composed of biomolecules that are the basis of life. The DNA of the cell nucleus contains essential information, but is viewed here as being driven by the transfer of information from the cytoskeleton.

In looking at the synapses between neurons, the author draws particular attention to the metabotropic links, as distinct from the ionotropic links that take the form of electrical signals via membrane ion channels. With the metabotropic links, neurotransmitters bind to G-protein coupled receptors (GPCR). These activate second messengers, which in turn act on protein kinases and phosphatises that modulate the cytoskeleton. The cytoskeleton in its turn signals protein production requirements to the nucleus of the cell. The fast electrical activity of the ion channels is contrasted with the slower biochemical processes within the neuron. Georgiev says that the Hameroff model only takes account of the biochemical and not the electrical activity. He disagrees with this exclusion of electrical activity, pointing out that Penfield's ground breaking research in the mid 20th century showed that conscious memories could be evoked by inserting electrodes into parts of the cortex.

Georgiev argues that in neurons, the electric field is not confined to the ion channels in the membrane, which is the conventional view, but that it can also act directly on the microtubules. This concept is in line with ideas put forward by Jibu and Yasue and also by Vitiello. The approach bof these researchers involves a quantum field theory of the electric dipoles of water molecules in the brain, and here, particularly within the neurons. The dipole rotational symmetry of the water molecules is proposed to break into the quanta of dipole vibrational waves or dipole wave quanta (dwq), which manifest as long-range correlations in water. As such, they transmit information in water.

These correlations are suggested by Georgiev to influence the conformation of the microtubule tubulin 'tails' that protrude from microtubules. The coherent behaviour of the tubulin tails can be modelled as solitary waves (solitons) propagating along the outer surface of the microtubules, and acting as a dissipationless mechanism for the transmission of information along the microtubule. Collisions of the waves formed by the tubulin tails are suggested to act as a computational gate for the control of cytoskeletal processes. It is already experimentally verified that tubulin activity controls the sites where microtubule associated proteins (MAPs) attach to microtubules, and also controls the transport of vesicles of neurotransmitters towards synapses. The output of the computation performed by the tubulin tails is here suggested to come via the MAP attachments and also the kinesin motor transport along the microtubules.

The author goes on to discuss the probabilistic nature of neurotransmitter release at the synapses, and the possible connection this has with quantum activity in the brain. The probability of the synapse firing in response to an electrical signal is estimated at only around 25%. Georgiev points out that an axon forms synapses with hundreds of other neurons, and that if the firing of all these synapses was random, the operation of the brain could prove chaotic. He suggests instead the choice of which synapses will fire is connected to consciousness, and that consciousness acts within neurons. Each synapse has about 40 vesicles holding neurotransmitters, but only one vesicle fires at any one time. Again the choice of vesicle seems to require some form of ordering. The structure of the grid in which the vesicles are held is claimed to be suitable to support vibrationally assisted quantum tunnelling. Georgiev also thinks that B-neurexin and neuroligin-1 proteins that form a bridge between the axonal and dendritic cytoskeletons are relevant to consciousness. Georgiev discusses Max Tegmark's paper, which conventional consciousness study thinking views as having completely dismissed the possibility of consciousness based on quantum coherence in the brain. In respect of this debate, Georgiev points out that the real question is whether the time to decoherence is greater or lesser than the timescale of dynamical changes in the brain. He agrees that if the decoherence time is shorter than the dynamical time, it is not feasible for quantum coherence to be involved in brain activity. In his 2000 paper, Tegmark has a decoherence time of 10^-13 seconds. It is suggested that neuronal activity is orchestrated via the conformational activity of tubulin subunits, and that this activity has a dynamical timescale that could fall within the Tegmark timescale. The conformational transition times within the tubular proteins of the microtubules coincides with transition times for the microtubules as a whole. Georgiev's answer to Tegmark is also an answer to the main thrust of the Koch and Hepp (2006) paper also purporting to dismiss quantum mind theories.

Georgiev's work represents something of a hybrid theory mixing the quantum brain dynamics model promoted in recent years by Jibu and Yasue ans also Vitiello with the quantum consciousness theory of Penrose and Hameroff. Georgiev thinks that the Hameroff scheme for instantiating quantum consciousness in the brain is flawed in a number of respects, and proposes a neuronal mechanism that is closer to quantum brain dynamics. Georgiev also rejects Hameroff's idea of quantum tunnelling at gap junctions between dendrites, citing a lack of suitable structures for coherence in the dendritic spines, where the junctions are located. Unfortunately, he does not propose an alternative method, by which the conscious activity in billions of individual neurons is bound together into the experience of unified consciousness, either by some connection to the gamma synchrony or by any other means.

However, he still appears to support the Penrose concept of objective reduction of the wave function as a result of macroscopic quantum coherence giving access to consciousness at the fundamental spacetime level. This implies that he thinks that at some stage, the solitons propagating along the microtubule undergo objective reduction and that this is the basis of consciousness.

5.)

Electric and magnetic fields inside neurons and their impact upon the cytoskeleton microtubules

Danko Georgiev, Medical University of Varna

http://cogprints.org/3190/

In this paper, Georgiev argues that any link between signals in the cortex and the microtubules has to be understood in terms of the local electromagnetic field. He dismisses a number of theories as to how the microtubules might support information processing and/or consciousness. For instance, the magnetic fields inside neurons are stated to be too weak relative to the background noise of the Earth's magnetic field to support information processing. Instead, he argues that attention needs to be focused on the electrical field, which is responsible for the signals passing along neuronal membranes via ion channels to synapses, and is seen as a necessary source of input into microtubules, if these are in fact involved in information processing or consciousness.

Evidence is claimed for the idea of a model based on structured water and positively charged ions. Magnetic resonance studies indicate that water in neurons is more structured than normal liquid water. A substantial part of the water in neurons is bound to various biomolecules. Much of the rest of the water is structured with high viscosity and dynamic correlations between individual molecules. Most of this structured water is around the cytoskeleton, and studies of this water have tended to indicate the presence of long-range dipolar ordering leading to internal electric fields or oscillations of electric fields.

It has been further suggested that structured water close to microtubules could generate solitons, a form of quanta propagating as solitary waves. The author suggests that this involves the C-termini tubulin 'tails' that project from the microtubules and are capable of multiple conformations. The properties of the tubulin tails are a function of the acidic aminoacid residues, which allows them to be highly flexible. Studies show that these tubulin tails interact with microtubule associated proteins. The carboxyl termini of the tubulin tails have been shown to undergo modifications when interacting with MAPs. The C-termini have also been shown to contain molecules (called chaperone molecules) that assist in the folding of protein, and in particular in ensuring that protein folds in the correct way rather than in a large number of other possible ways. A cycle of removal and restoration of a tyrosine residue from C-termini is a characteristic of stable axonal microtubules. Changes to protein side chains located near the C-termini appear to regulate the interaction between microtubules and MAPs. MAP proteins such as tau and kinesin bind most effectively with particular side chains. Differences in the binding of MAPs are suggested to modulate the function of microtubules.

Georgiev suggests that molecular studies allow the construction of models, by which microtubules can process electrical information. The C-termini are electrically charged and physically flexible and can undergo conformational changes, in response to changes in the vector of the electrical field. Solitons can transfer energy between the tubulin tails without dissipation. These solitons are suggested to be capable of directly effecting the scaffold of presynaptic proteins and the release of neurotransmitters from synapses.