Other Quantum 5

Other quantum related books and papers including Strawson on the experiental level, Satinover on protein, Hadley on computer/brain differences, and Schwarz on freewill.

1.) Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panscychism - Galen Strawson - Suggests an experiental level in the physical world as a way out of the mind matter problem

2.) The Quantum Brain - Jeffrey Satinover - Most interesting in respect of its discussions of quantum tunnelling and coherence in protein.

3.) The Essential role of consciousness - Robert Hadley - Argues that it is not necessary to accept Penrose's Godel-based argument to think that computers and brains are different in their handling of some mathematics.

4.) Beyond scientific materialism - Imants Baruss - View of consciousness somewhat akin to David Bohm.

5.) The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of the Mental Force - Jeffrey Scwartz and Sharon Begley - Clinical evidence in favour of freewill.

1.)

Realistic Monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism - In: Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism

Galen Strawson

Imprint Academic, 2006

INTRODUCTION: Strawson argues for a form of panpsychism rather than quantum consciousess. However, his argument as to the difficulty of extracting consciousness from physical matter is almost the same as the reasoning that has caused other researchers to look to quantum theories of consciousness for an explanation. Further, at least some versions of quantum consciousness have effective answers to the more forcible arguments against Strawson's panpsychism. Firstly, they can deal with the lack of any apparent experiental qualities in either the quanta or larger inanimate objects. In quantum theories, the quanta can be seen as proto-experiental, in that while not be conscious in themselves, they have the potential, in particular circumstances, to give rise to consciousness. Secondly, in at least some theories, quantum consciousness also gets over the problem of how very large numbers of small fundamental particles bind together into a larger mind, by proposing the existence of macroscopic quantum features in the brain. These undergo wave function collapse to produce consciousness.

Strawson starts with the assumption that the universe is entirely physical. Mental activity is included within this physical universe. He views consciousness as a fundamental fact, the existence of which is more certain than any other fact. In his view, philosophers and scientists, who attempt to deny the existence of consciousness, are in effect denying the wholly physical nature of the universe, because they deny the physical nature of its best known phenomenon.

Strawson accuses mainstream thinkers, and particularly Dennett, of being closet Cartesians, in that they have an underlying assumption that consciousness is non-physical, and thus separated from the physical universe. This means that because they passionately believe that nothing other than the physical exists, they are forced into the perverse position, of denying the existence of consciousness, the best known fact about ourselves, in order to achieve a consistent world view. However, if we really view the universe as wholly physical, consciousness, which is a fact of the universe, has to be physical, and therefore the physical and consciousness cannot be treated as separate categories of existence.

Strawson makes the assumption that the physical universe is comprised of 'ultimates', and is spatio-temporal in its fundamental nature. In discussing physical matter, he points out that when it is put together in the particular way that it is put together in brains, conscious experience occurs. Given the fact that conscious experience arises out of a particular organisation of physical matter, he argues that there must be something experiental in the matter from which it arises.

Emergent properties: Strawson admits that probably the best shot at getting conscious experience out of physical matter is the idea of consciousness as an emergent property of non-experiental matter. Emergent properties are common in physics. A property can emerge at one level of matter that does not exist at the underlying levels. Strawson examines the classic example of such emergence, the liquidity of water in a particular temperature range. Liquidity is not a property of individual water molecules, nor is it a property of hydrogen or oxygen atoms, nor of their sub-atomic components. Liquidity only arises when a number of water molecules slide past one another, in a manner governed by van de Waals forces operating between electrical dipoles. Strawson's main point here is that the emergence of the liquidity property can be understood in terms of the electromagnetic force acting between the water molecules. Strawson says that emergent phenomena are wholly dependent on what they emerge from. If that were not the case, they would not be emergent. He argues that, if conscious experience emerges from matter, it should be explained in a similar manner to the emergence of liquidity, by reference to underlying forces and particles. The only way out of this problem that Strawson can see is for the underlying matter to have some experiental quality.

Strawson goes on to discuss Vitalism. This was popular in the nineteenth century, when some theorists thought that living organisms were so different from inanimate matter that the difference had to be explained by some special 'vital' feature in organic matter. Subsequently, it proved possible to reduce organic matter to chemistry and thence physics. However, Strawson reminds us that this was only achieved by leaving consciousness out of the definition of life. He also reminds us that in the early phases of the scientific age, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many scientists were happy with the idea of organisms as machines, but were as puzzled by consciousness, as we are in the present period.

Further to this, Strawson discusses the idea of the proto-experiental. Some researchers have suggested that the problem of the experiental emerging from the non-experiental can be obviated by saying that the underlying particles or forces are proto-experiental. Strawson's reply is that if something is proto-experiental, it must have some feature that makes it different from being merely non-experiental. In the same way, particles, such as those in water molecules that respond to the electromagnetic force are different from those that do not.

Strawson's arguments might appear strong where they criticise the position of the mainstream, as regards obtaining consciousness from matter, but as is often the case in consciousness studies, he is less convincing in establishing a functioning system of consciousness. Strawson's position is panpsychist, to the extent that he suggests that all matter has an experiental property. The two main problems with the panpsychist position are the lack of evidence for anything experiental in inanimate matter, and even if experiental qualities were to exist there, the difficulties of binding all the experiental particles together into a conscious mind. His view is that just as the physical laws allow liquidity to arise from water, there is no reason why forces should not exist that allow experience to arise in a similar way. This seems logically possible, but leaves a considerable gap between existing knowledge and what we are looking for.

Neither Strawson nor most of his critics mention quantum theories of consciousness, but it is clear that these have also arisen because of the apparent difficulty of extracting consciousness from physical matter. Further, at least some versions of quantum consciousness have effective answers to the problems apparent in Strawson's panpsychism. In these quantum theories, the quanta can reasonably be seen as proto-experiental, in that while not being conscious in themselves, they have the potential, in particular circumstances, to give rise to consciousness. At least in some versions, quantum consciousness also gets over the problem of how many small experiental or proto-experiental particles bind together into a mind, by proposing the existence of macroscopic quantum features in the brain that undergo wave function collapse, in order to produce consciousness.

2.)

The Quantum Brain

Jeffrey Satinover

John Wiley & Sons (2001)

INTRODUCTION: This book is mainly of interest for its discussion of quantum features and particularly quantum tunnelling in protein, an area which more mainstream science popularisations are not often keen to discuss. Since Satinover wrote this book, the discovery of functional room-temperature, quantum coherence in photosynthetic protein has brought the importance of quantum activity in protein more to the fore. Apart from this discussion about protein, Satinover is mainly interested in developing the idea of quantum ramdomness driving chaos-based patterns of macroscopic neural processing. Although, he appears to derive a good part of his material from Penrose and Hameroff, he is more concerned with information processing than consciousness, and chooses to dismiss the Penrose/Hameroff consciousness theory without a proper discussion of the matter.

The researcher, John Hopfield, demonstrated that a type of neural net, now known as a Hopfield network, has an identical mathematical description to magnetic systems called spin glasses. These are magnetic substances that demonstrate collective behaviour, without the need for external orchestration.

Satinover discusses a stable arrangement of magnets, in which opposite poles are holding the magnets apart. If the system is vigorously disturbed, this stable arrangement breaks down, but after a time, the system will settle into a new stable arrangement, to which it can always return after minor disturbances, although now there are more magnets than previously that are not aligned in parallel.

Ferromagnetic materials such as iron have many small areas or domains, in which electron spins (effectively magnetic charges) are aligned. But the domains have many different alignments, and these electrons are in a precarious position, where they can easily be flipped into a new alignment.

These ferromagnetic groups of neighbouring spins are mathematically similar to the excitatory (mainly glutamate) connections between neurons. However, in addition to spins that try to align in the same direction, there are antiferromagnetic systems that align in alternate directions, and these turn out to be mathematically similar to the inhibitory (mainly GABA) connections between neurons.

Materials that have ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic domains mixed are referred to as spin glasses. This is a random mix of ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic material, where adjacent electrons competing to align, or flip one another, are always on the edge of change, and are argued to resemble the analogous excitatory and inhibitory mix of neurons. A spin glass system has more than one 'best arrangement' and is similar to a brain, in that it can store new data without erasing existing material.

The brain and chaos: The brain is here regarded as a self-organising system that mathematically resembles the spin glass structure discussed above. However, it is pointed out that self-governing ensembles have a tendency towards chaos, meaning not actual disorder but deterministic chaos. The development of the system could in principle be described by an algorithm, but because this would require such a vast amount of information, the system is in practice unpredictable. The system does repeat patterns or behaviour, but they are similar, rather than exactly the same. It is suggested here that quantum randomness in areas of the brain might be amplified by chaos.

Microtubules: Satinover is interested in the possible involvement of microtubules in brain processing. The cytoskeleton, of which microtubules are the most important component, is considered to be uniquely suited to carry signals, because it spans the whole cell. The cytoskeleton used to be viewed, mainly as a support structure, but more recent studies (1&2) show that they are also signalling mechanisms. The self-organised activity of microtubules and associated proteins and filaments, is seen in recent visualisation studies, to control the mobility of cells and the configuration of dendrites, through which signals enter the cell. This structure is likened to the update rules governing interaction between neighbouring units which drives the evolution of so-called cellular automata from simplicity to complexity. Within the hexagonal tubulin grid that makes up the microtubule, each tubulin has six immediate neighbours, an arrangement of the same type as those conjectured by cellular automatons. The microtubule network as a whole is said to be harmonious and suitable for the transmission of vibrations. It is suggested that the neuron network of the brain is linked to the internal microtubule processing within neurons. The microtubule network is viewed as analagous to the Hopfield network and spin glass systems discussed above.

Quantum aspects of protein: The best section of this book is the discussion of the quantum aspects of protein, the basic building blocks of organic matter. A protein is a string of a hundred or more amino acid molecules. The amino acids are attached to one another by bridges called peptides, so that the protein is a macromolecule. Each amino acid has a unique shape, and a unique distribution of electric charge. For a protein to carry out its necessary functions within an organism, it must fold in a precise manner, at or very close to, the energy minima.

The problem with this system is that there can be trillions of similar ways for a protein to fold. Proteins can assume a very large number of conformational states, with a large number of energy minima. Despite this huge number of possible states, proteins can, within seconds, find the correct conformations and energy minima, which are also the most functional configurations.

There is, as yet, no clear indication as to how this is to be achieved. Random searching for a minimum energy conformation would take longer than the life of the universe to reach a solution. The position is not much better for supercomputers, where despite years of generous funding, it has proved impossible to calculate the minimum energy configuration for even a short chain of amino acids. This is known as the protein-folding problem. DNA encodes the primary structure of the protein, which is the sequence of the amino acids. At a secondary stage, the amino acid chains are formed into particular shapes, such as helices. At the tertiary stage, sections of helices and other shapes are brought together, and folded into a particular configuration of electric charges. It is this last stage of folding that constitutes the protein-folding problem. Satinover argues that the problem of protein folding is similar to the means, by which spin glasses reach alignment, with a huge number of axes, along which protein must flip.

Satinover explains that to achieve what they do proteins use quantum features. Some of the electrons in the protein are in a wave or superposed state, with the wave extending over a considerable distance through the protein. This is referred to as tunnelling, with the wave form of the electron able to penetrate into regions that the point-particle form of the electron cannot reach. This electron tunnelling can be exceptionally sensitive to minor couplings. In helical structures in particular, the influence of quantum tunnelling falls off only slowly with distance. The tunnelling of electrons triggers conformational changes in protein, and further to this, conformational changes in protein trigger yet more quantum tunnelling. Water is vital to living organisms, and it also exhibits tunnelling between molecules. The tunnelling process orders water into chiral (left and right-handed) clusters, which play an important role in protein folding. Tunnelling makes low-energy states more accessible within protein, and this probably proved to be an adaptive advantage, from an early stage in evolution. Studies by Peter Wolynes at the Centre of Biophysics and Computational Biology and also at the National Centre for Supercomputing Applications have simulated the tunnelling process in protein, showing that theories of spin glasses can be applied to the protein-folding problem, and also showing that tunnelling makes systems more efficient, particularly in the search for minimum energy levels. The advantage of quantum processing is that an electron can simultaneously search many routes for the most efficient route.

The existence of quantum tunnelling in protein raises the question of the vulnerability of quantum processes to decoherence. In general, the movement of molecules as a function of heat serves to disrupt quantum tunnelling. However, it is claimed that the opposite is true in the case of protein. Proteins also exhibit phonons that represent travelling, classical, mechanical coherence in protein. These are claimed to enhance tunnelling distance. This represents a mutually reinforcing relationship between classical, mechanical vibrations and quantum activity, so as to enhance short-lived coherences. Decoherence of superpositions may happen rapidly, but may collapse to just the right classical state, which also puts the protein into the right condition for the next burst of quantum coherence. Studies performed a number of years after Satinover's book look to have demonstrated just such a pattern of decline and resurgence in coherence, where quantum coherence has been demonstrated in photosynthetic proteins.

Tunnelling by hydrogen protons has been found to be essential for enzymatic action. Here again, there is an interaction between tunnelling protein conformation and more tunnelling, and here too, studies show that classical vibrations, rather than disrupting tunnelling, are actually required for tunnelling. Thus proteins, merely be absorbing heat from the environment, can initiate computational processing. Life here seems to use quantum effects to extract order from disorder. A study by Judith Klinman (3.) at Berkeley showed that hydrogen proton tunnelling in protons can occur at room temperature.

Subsequent to its discussion of quantum effects in protein, this book becomes less interesting. Ultimately, it is commited to 'the brain's a deterministic computer doctrine', albeit a computer driven by quantum randomness feeding into deterministic chaos. In essence the writer is concerned with quantum/chaotic information processing rather than consciousness.

Satinover appears to derive quite a lot from Penrose and Hameroff, but as is often the case, intellectual rigour goes out of the window, when discussing this theory. The whole theory appears to be dismissed solely on the basis of the Hameroff side of the theory, which is to do with implementation in the brain, rather than Penrose's original reasons for looking to quantum theory. Furthermore, if one is to argue against this theory on the basis of decoherence, as happens here, it is necessary to discuss the possibility of shielding of quantum processes, or the possible involvement in consciousness of the shorter lived coherences discussed by Satinover. This discussion is lacking in this book.

References:-
1.) Tuszynski, J. et al (1998) - Information processing and quantum computation in microtubules - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 2.) Brown, J. & Tuszynski, J. (1997) - Dipole interactions in axonal microtubules as a mechanism of signal perception - Physical Review E 56, pp. 5834-40
3.) Bahnson, B. & Klinman, J. (1995) - Hydrogen Tunnelling in Enzymes Catalysis - Methods in Enzymology, 249, pp. 373-397
4.) Wolynes, P. (1992) - Spin glass ideas and the protein folding problem - In: Spin Glasses and Biology, pp. 225-6 - Ed. Stein, D. - World Scientific Publishing
5.) Farid, R. et al (1993) - Electron transfer in proteins - Current Opinion in Structural Biology, 3, p.225 P. 5.) Stuchebrukov, A. (1996) - Tunnelling currents in electron transfer reactions in proteins - Journal of Chemical Physics, 105, pp. 10819-10829
6.) Stuchebrukov, A. (1996) - Tunnelling currents in electron transfer reactions in proteins - Journal of Chemical Physics, 105, pp. 7497-7596
7.) Balabin, I. & Onuchic, J. (1998) - A new framework for electron transfer calculation - Journal of Physical Chemical B, 102, pp. 7497-7596
8.) Ogawa, M. et al (1993) - Distance dependence of intramolecular electron transfer rates across oligoprolines - Journal of Physical Chemistry, 97, pp. 11456-11463
9.) Balabin, I. & Onuchic, J. (1996) - Connection between simple models and quantum mechanical models for electron transfer tunnelling - Journal of Physical Chemistry, 100, pp. 11573-11580
10.) Basran, J., Sutcliffe, J. & Scrutton, N. (1999) - Enzymatic H-transfers requires vibration driven exteme tunnelling - Biochemistry, 38, pp. 3218-3222
11.) Wolynes, P. & Kuki, A. - Electron transfer paths in protein - National Center for Supercomputing Applications

3.)

The Essential role of consciousness in mathematical cognition

Robert Hadley, Simon Fraser University

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17, No. 1-2, 2010, pp. 27-46

Hadley puts forward alternative possibilities to Penrose's argument from the Godel theorem, in order to reach a Penrose-type conclusion about brains and computers. He argues that a system that lacked consciousness would be incapable of certain concepts and certain proofs. Hadley refers to Kant's argument that the perception of an object requires the unity of consciousness. In modern terms, the difficulty of seeing how the unity of consciousness is achieved by the brain is referred to as the binding problem, and is not the same as, but is closely intertwined with the question of consciousness. The concept of objects is claimed to require certain assumptions about space and time, and also the categorisation of the objects themselves. Conscious experience may also be needed to understand the relationship of one object to another. In terms of mathematics, the natural numbers are an even set, which is conceived of as existing simultaneously. It is possible for human students of mathematics to think of an unbounded set of objects existing simultaneously, but this concept produces a circularity for computers.

There is also the question of understanding geometrically-based proofs, where to understand the proof, it is necessary to conceive a geometric design, as a whole or unit. This involves an argument concerning the situation where human perception is able to immediately see that an arrangement of dots comprises a hexagon, which is seen as a unit, whole or gestalt, although all that exists is a few printed dots, and there is no continuous hexagon printed on the paper. A computer analysis of the dots could generate the angles of relationship between them, but not by itself generate the idea of a geometrical objects such as a hexagon as a single cohesive whole. There needs to be a realisation that the dots at the corners of the hexagon (the only thing actually printed on the paper) belong together, and although something might be programmed in for particular dots, there is no way to generate this for arrangements of dots in general, from present forms of computation. It requires human conceptions about the parts of cohesive wholes belonging together to achieve this. Complex diagrams need to be perceived as integrated gestalt patterns. Therefore the author argues that it is not necessary to accept Penrose's argument from the Godel theorem, in order to agree with his main conclusion that brains and existing forms of computer are different, and consciousness not possessed by computers is required for some human brain activities.

4.)

Beyond scientific materialism

Imants Baruss, King's University College, Ontario

Journal of Consciousness Studies 17, No. 7-8, 2010, pp. 213-31

Baruss considers that we need to go somewhat beyond scientific materialism to explain matter itself, and that this means we also need to go beyond scientific materialism to understand consciousness, while at the same time not proposing anything that is inconsistent with physics. He considers the possibility that consciousness could be inserted as a primitive element in quantum theory. But he is more inclined to think that consciousness could be more fundamental than that, involving a 'pre-physical' substrata underlying both mental experience and matter.

Baruss quotes Jerry Fodor (1. 2000) as saying that the last half century of research has demonstrated that there are aspects of human mental processes that are not accessible to the present computational models, theories and techniques. Dennett himself admitted (2. 1978, 3. Giunti, 1995, 4. van Gelder & Port, 1995) that for computationalism to work there needed to be a formal language in the brain, which he called 'mentalese', but evidence of this has never been found, and modern computer scientists do not appear to believe in the probability of such a language.

Baruss refers to Henry Stapp who theorises that mental effort allows the quantum Zeno effect (frequent measurement preventing anything from happening at the quantum level) to hold in place a template that allows our intentions to manifest. Jeffrey Schwarz has invoked Stapp's idea to explain the self-directed neuroplasticity that he found using brain imaging in the right dorsomedial area of the brain (5. Schwarz, 2002).

Baruss is prepared to consider that there may be some truth amongst the various quantum theories of consciousness, but thinks that the real answer to the question lies at a more fundamental level. He suggests a fundamental 'pre-physical' level of reality from which the world of matter and the mental/conscious world arises. He indicates that this is somewhat akin to David Bohm's idea of the implicate order underlying and resolving the differences between quantum and relativity theory, and also provides the level of the universe from which consciousness arose. It is suggested here that consciousness arising from the deepest level could effect the annihilation and creation operators that shape spacetime, and thus influence physical manifestations. It is further suggested here that changes in our intentions could produce changes in the deepest level, which could in turn influence the physical level. Baruss further suggests that some altered states of consciousness involved identification with this deeper level of the universe.

My response to these Bohm/Baruss ideas is to find them interesting, but to wonder whether it is necessary to invoke this extra layer to the universe, for which there is as yet little or no hard evidence. It does seem that consciousness could arise just from the quantum and spacetime, although we are still lacking a properly agreed theory for resolving quantum and relativity theory.

References:-
1.) Jerry Fodor (2000) - The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology - MIT Press
2.) Daniel Dennett (1978) - Brainstorms
3.) Giunti, M. (1995) - Dynamical models of cognition - In:- Mind as Motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition, pp. 549-71, Eds. Port, R. & van Gelder, T.   - MIT Press
4.) van Gelder, T. & Port, R. (1995) - It's about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition, pp. 1-43 - In:- Mind as Motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition, pp. 549-71, Eds. Port, R. & van Gelder, T.   - MIT Press
5.) Schwartz, J. & Begley, S. (2002) - The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the power of mental force

5.)

The Mind and The Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of the Mental Force

Jeffrey Schwartz and Sharon Begley

Harper Collins (2002)

INTRODUCTION: This book discusses clinical practise that suggests that the conscious will can alter habits or compulsions that are driven by flaws in the structure of patients' brains. It is also suggested that the exercise of the conscious will can mould new structures in the brain to support an altered habituation. The author links this finding to Henry Stapp's version of quantum consciousness, in which the whole brain of the observer is put into superposition.

As a psychiatrist treating patients with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) Schwartz became critical of the behaviourist based methods of treating OCD in the mid-to-late twentieth century. These methods claimed a 60-70% success rate, but it turned out that this impressive figure excluded up to 30% of patients who refused to undertake the treatment proposed in the first place, plus a further 20% that dropped out during the course of treatment.

Research during the last twenty years has shown that specific brain structures are involved in obsessive compulsive disorder. The orbital frontal cortex, the caudate nucleus and the anterior cingulate gyrus were all found to be over active in OCD patients. Studies, notably those by E.T. Rolls at Oxford University, showed that the orbital frontal cortex acted as an error detector. It became very active when something was not in line with expectations, such as when an expected reward for an action was not delivered. Other studies involving card games showed that patients with damage to the underside of the frontal cortex did not show aversion to decks of cards that consistently produced poor results, in the way that normal controls did. This area of the frontal cortex is described here as an 'intuition generator'. The normal players never rationalised their aversion to the bad decks of cards, they just avoided them. Intuition or literally 'gut feeling', because the aversion could be felt at the visceral level, could in this case prove a better guide than reasoning. In contrast patients with damage to the lower frontal cortex continued to use the bad decks even when they had understood rationally that they were a bad risk.

What was of interest to Schwarz was that error detection by the orbital frontal produced a sense of unease that was exactly the feeling that compelled OCD patients to continually wash their hands etc. The anterior cingulate was also implicated in this. The difference between the subjects of the gambling study and the OCD patients was that the gamblers had an underactive frontal area that failed to give then an intuitive warning, while the OCD patients had an over active area that gave them repeated and largely unnecessary warnings.

Another area that studies showed to be over active in OCD patients was the striatum, comprising the caudate nucleus and the putamen. All areas of the cortex and parts of the thalamus and the brain stem project to the striatum, and notably prefrontal areas concerned with planning behaviour have strong connections here. Small clusters of these prefrontal projections are known as matrisomes and are found near small patches of the striatum known as striosomes. The striosomes receive input from the prefrontal and in particular from the orbital frontal and anterior cingulate that are implicated in OCD, and also receive direct input from the amygdala, which is particularly involved in the experience of fear. Thus the striatum and particularly the caudate nucleus are an area of intermingling of emotional and rational input.

In the mid 1990s researchers discovered specialised neurons referred to as tonically active neurons (TANs) that are situated where matrisomes and striosomes meet, and are therefore well placed to integrate emotional and rational input. TANs respond strongly to reward-linked stimuli. TANs also responded when a previously neutral stimuli becomes associated with a reward. TANs are thought to be involved in the development of habits, with particular environmental cues having emotional meaning and producing particular behaviour.

Schwarz was unusual among 20^th century researchers in thinking that as part of therapy the exercise of the conscious will could alter the responses or gating patterns of the TANs. He explained to OCD patients that their drives to hand wash etc. did not belong to 'them', but were an objective malfunction of part of their brain. This enabled some patients to consciously resist the impulses, because they were now perceived as an alien intrusion. Beyond this patients were encouraged to use the conscious will to refocus attention onto something other than the intrusive urge to a compulsive behaviour. This approach proved quite effective.

The ability to alter such brain-based compulsive behaviour by use of the conscious will to focus on other activities, and to eventually use neuroplasticity to change the actual functioning and structure of the brain raised for Schwarz the whole question of the efficacy of consciousness, against a background where most researchers reject the efficacy of the conscious will.

Schwarz bases his view of the conscious will and its efficacy on Henry Stapp's theory of quantum consciousness. This in turn was influenced by the work of von Neumann. Stapp was particularly critical of the 'don't think, calculate' approach which allowed science to ignore the implications of quantum theory. Stapp's view of quantum theory is that while the output of measuring devices was random, the observer has a role in choosing the questions that are put to nature. The observer's conscious thoughts are instrumental in posing the question without which nothing can happen. This is where the ideas of von Neumann and the way in which he departed from Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation come in. Bohr had assumed that the measuring instruments and the observers could be described by classical physics, but von Neumann proposed that the measuring devices and the human brains of the observers were in superposition as well as the quantum wave. In this theory, the brain of the observer is in a quantum superposition, which collapses when the measurement is made. Here the entire brain of an observer is in a quantum state. The quantum brain state evolves deterministically until a conscious observation of a measurement occurs. The only freedom for the observing brain lies in the initial choice of question to put to nature. Stapp thinks that this choice does affect the dynamics of the brain involved.

I think that the main interest of Schwarz's work lies in the evidence that conscious volition can alter behaviour, and further more alter it through the neuroplasticity of identifiable structures and processes in the brain. I find it quite hard to live with aspects of the Stapp interpretation. Brains and measuring equipments in superposition conflicts with most ideas about decoherence. Even if it is argued that there is no wave function collapse as such, there are observable features of quanta in superposition that are never observed in brain-sized objects. Even if we accept this type of superposition there is a further problem with the question posing function ahead of the deterministic evolution of the quantum wave. What is it that poses the question? Quantum theory as more usually described gives answers about the properties of quanta, but does not provide the questions. In the end there seems to be an over-arching questioner not instantiated in any physical thing, and therefore presumably a dualistic entity, with the philosophical problems that that brings in its train.