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Other Quantum


Papers & Articles on other versions of quantum consciousness


1.) Quantum cosmology & the Hard Problem - Chris King

2.) Virtual photons & consciousness - Herms Romijn

3.) Conscious brains electromagnetic field - Johnjoe McFadden

4.) Cemi Field Theory - Johnjoe McFadden

5.) Electomagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness - Johnjoe McFadden

6.) Are our spaces made of words? - Jonathan Edwards





Quantum Cosmology and the Hard Problem of the Conscious Brain

Chris King

Dept. of Mathematics, University of Auckland

In:  Tuszynski, J. Ed.  The Emerging Physics of Consciousness    Springer    ISBN-13 978-3-540-23890-4

The author favours the approach of Chalmers over the approach of Dennett in looking at the problem of consciousness. He describes Dennett's 'multiple drafts' concept as a description of how verbal reports of internal states are produced, but as lacking in any explanation of how consciousness is achieved ( 1. Dennett ). He reminds us of Chalmers comment that a theory of physics that does not explain consciousness is not a theory of everything. Furthermore, he argues that ultimately our knowledge of objective science is only available via our subjective conscious experience. He cautions against the common tendency to try and discount quantum ucertainty as something that will be averaged out as a result of the very large number of quanta involved in any macroscopic state. In Chaos theory, which may well have a role in brain processes, small fluctuations may be inflated into important differences, and quantum uncertainties may be included in these small differences. King goes on to look at the possible uses of quantum computation. He mentions that classical computing has a problem with the potentially unlimited time needed to check a range of possibilities.

King favours the transactional interpretation of EPR type non-local quantum correlations. In the transactional interpretation of non-local events, when a measurement is made on an entangled particle, it sends a photon back in time to when it and the other entangled particle were emitted, and then forward in time to the second entangled particle. Thus the net time taken to send the quantum information about the measurement of the first particle is zero, and the effect of measurement on the second particle appears to be instantaneous, despite the spatial gap between them. The backward travel in time, which looks like an exotic feature is allowed by the laws of physics as embodied in both the Maxwell and Schrodinger equations.

King thinks that the transactional interpretation of non-locality can be combined with quantum computing to give a spacetime anticipating system and that this may be basic to the way the brain works. He argues that the brain's performance is not particularly impressive in terms of what classical computers are good at, but it's impressive in terms of anticipating environmental and behavioural changes. He also stresses the complex structure of neurons which contrasts to the simplistic way in which their interactions are sometimes modelled in neuroscience. It is suggested that 'edge-of-chaos' transition in and out of chaos could be involved in perception. Studies of the olfactory cortex show that  there is chaotic excitation forming a wave that eventually settles into a basin in the energy landscape. Sometimes this comprises a new basin, in which case this is part of the learning process. The advantage of a chaotic system is its sensitivity to small differences, allowing them to explore a wide range of possibilities, rather than quickly being trapped in one possibility far from the global optimum. Chaotic activity leads to states where the brain would be very finely balanced between different possibilities, and at this point it might be sufficiently sensitive to be influenced by quantum uncertainty. It has been demonstrated that a single ion channel can excite a hippocampal neuron, which can in turn lead to global changes.

King takes the view that adaption/survival problems of an animal in an open environment are intractable because of the exponential growth of the number of options available. The number of options rapidly exponentiates. A gazelle facing a lion would be frozen in a catatonic state, as a result of a version of Turing's 'halting problem'. For a process to be adaptive an organism may be thought to have something between 100 and 1,000ms to make a decision. Quantum models of the mind are suggested to solve this problem, and this might involve processing within cells.. However, King argues that for good adaptive reasons, the brain goes beyond the brute force of quantum computing, to achieve intuitive decisions and creativity both of which involves subjective consciousness. These ideas appear to be similar in spirit to the Penrose concept of non-computability. In general computation seeks a single outcome while creative activity and some other behaviours seeks diversity.

Chaotic excitability is suggested as one of the earliest features of eukaryote cells. This would allow the single cell to get feedback from the environment, rather than becoming stuck in a particular and unsatisfactory oscillation. The behaviour of single cell organisms in being able to navigate and behave adaptively in their environment is in any case a problem for cognitive theory. 

References:-

1)  Dennett, D.  (1991)    Consciousness Explained 

2)  Freeman, W.  (1991)   Scientific American, 264    +   Ruthen, R.  (1993)    Scientific American, 268, pp. 110-7   +   Skarda, C. & Freeman, W.  (1987)    Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 10, pp. 161-95

Cramer, J.  (1986)    Review of Modern Physics, 41, pp. 1881-1927

Deutch, D. (1985)  Proceedings of the Royal Society London A400, pp. 97-117

Goldman-Rakic, P.  (1992)    Scientific American, Sep, pp. 73-9

King, C.  (1978)  University of Auckland Math. Rept. Serv, 134

King C.  (1989)   Physics Essays, 2. pp. 128-51

King, C.  (1990)  Origins of Life Evol. Biosph, 20, 15

King, C.  (1991)  Prog. Neurobiology, 36, pp. 279-308

King, C.  (1996)   Fractal Neurodynamics and Quantum Chaos  In: Macormac, E. & Stamenov, M. Eds.  Fractals of Brain Fractals

King, C.  (1997)   Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 18, pp. 179-233

King, C.  (2001)   WED Monographs, 1

King, C.  (2003)    Neuroquantology, 1, pp. 129-148

King, C.  (2002)    WED Reviewed Monographs

King, C.  (2004)    Neuroquantology, 3

Pollack, G.  (2001)    Cells, Gels and the Engines of Life   Ebner & Sons

Zeki, S.  (1992)    Scientific American, Sep, pp. 43-50

Zurek, W.  (1991)   Physics Today, Oct





Herms Romijn

Netherlands Institute for Brain Research

Are Virtual Photons the Elementary Carriers of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 1, 2002, pp. 61-81

Romijn puts forward the concept that subjectivity or consciousness is coded into the virtual photons that generate electric and magnetic fields. This approach has considerable advantages. Photons intermediating the electromagnetic force are, as far as we know, the most basic level of the universe. At this level the fundamental components of the universe have given properties that cannot be explained, analysed or reduced further. So both the charge on the electron and the ability of the photon to intermediate it across space are given properties that cannot be explained or reduced. This is the only physical level at which it is possible to have properties that cannot be reduced to something more fundamental.
 
The article suggests that photons carry subjectivity or consciousness as such a given property. This is in principle possible because irreducible properties are present at this level. It is more reasonable than the mainstream approach, which suggests that a new property of consciousness can be produced by banging together previously unconscious bits of matter. The problem would be the same if we tried to say that electrical charge was a function of banging things together in some complex system. It might look plausible, but we would forever be looking for what actually happened that produced the charge. Romijn’s theory is not fully panpsychic. Although subjectivity is present at the level of photons, it requires brain sytems to generate ordered patterns that are the basis of actual conscious experience.
 
Romijn views the brain as a chaotic self-organising process, the outcome of which is the pattern of electric and magnetic fields generated by the dendritic trees of neurons. The author thinks that these patterns code for the qualia. Virtual photons comprise the electric and magnetic fields and it is these which are claimed to encode conscious experience. Romijn argues that they are causally necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

Romijn takes an initially conventional approach in pointing out that brain scan studies show a correlation between neural activity and subjective experiences (Raichle, 1998) (1) (Schacter et al) (2) and (Frith et al, 1999) (3). Romijn takes the view that subjective experience is as real for the experiencer as brain scan activity is for the third party investigator.

The Role of Dendrites
Romijn discusses the detailed behaviour of dendrites. When a dendrite receives a signal from another neuron there is a depolarisation of the membrane, in the case of an excitatory signal, and hyperpolarisation in the event of an inhibitory signal. This creates an electric field between the the part of the dendrite membrane that has become polarised or hyperpolarised and the rest of the membrane. The greater part of the electric field will flow towards the cell body and the axon hillock because the dendrite is thicker in that direction. This action along the dendrite also generates a magnetic field.

The dendritic tree has been shown to use several different forms of information processing. At the synapse the incoming pattern of action potentials determines which of various neurotransmitters stored there are released. (Salter & DE Koninck, 1999) (4). On the dendritic side, receptors are sensitive to particular neurotransmitters. The receptors are clustered in complex spatial patterns. Receptors can modulate each others performance. Outside the synaptic cleft, the extracellular fluid has a low concentration of ions, neurotransmitters and hormones that may exert a synchronising effect between neurons (Zoli et al, 1998) (5). Studies have shown that the dendritic tree can detect the individual discharge of synapses and has mechanisms for amplifying the signal to noise ratio (Maren & Baudry, 1995) (6). Dendritic spines provide the postsynaptic contact sites for 80% of excitatory synapses (Andersen & Figenschou, 1999) (7). Spines can change their shape in a period of milliseconds, which changes the flow of information into the dendrites (Rusakov et al, 1996) (8) Fischer et al, 1998) (9), (Smith, 1999) (10).

Protein molecules constitute ion channels, receptors and enzymes and have electrically charged groups held together by van der Waals forces. These electrostatic binding forces determine the tertiary structure of proteins, and thence some of their properties. The ions, receptors and enzymes experience fluctuations as a result of the electrical field around the dendrite (Fröhlich, 1975) (11), (Goodman et al, 1995) (12) and (Hong, 1995) (13). It has been shown that postsynaptic receptor and ion distribution continually undergoes non-linear changes because of the synaptic electric fields. All this means that the dendritic tree has the ability to tune itself to the inflow of information, which in turn results in ordered electric and magnetic fields.

Romijn points out that synaptic transmissions are probabilistic. When an action potential reaches a synapse, there is no certainty that the synapse will fire. There is only a probability, of between 30% and 80%, depending on the type  of synapse, that it will fire. In some studies (Lehman et al, 1998) (15), (Zeki & Bartels, 1998) (16), field configurations, which had to remain stable in the cortex for a minimal time such as 120ms were related to various types of mental activity. Shorter lived fields are thought to relate to the unconscious level. The electrical and magnetic fields are seen as having a vast number of possible semi-stable configurations they can take up in response to either external stimuli or existing memories (Sakai & Miyashita, 1994) (17) and Tononi et al, 1994) (18). These fields formed out of virtual photons, the intermediating particle/waves of the electromagnetic force, are deemed to be the carriers of consciousness in the brain.

References:-

(1)  Raichle, M. (1998)  The neural correlates of consciousness  Phil. Trans. Royal Soc London B, 353, pp. 1889-901

(2)  Schacter et al (1998)  Memory, consciousness and neuroimaging  Phil. Trans Royal Soc. London, 353, pp. 1861-78

(3)  Frith et al (1999)  The neural correlates of conscious experience  Trends in Cognitive Science, 3, pp. 105-14

(4)  Salter, M. & De Koninck, Y. (1999)  An ambiguous fast synapse  Nature Neuroscience, 2, pp. 199-200

(5)  Zoli et al (1998)  The emergence of the volume transmission concept  Brain Research Review, 26, pp. 136-47

(6)  Maren, S. & Baudry, M. (1995)  Properties and mechanisms of synaptic plasticity  Neurobiology, learning, memory, 63, pp. 1-18

(7)  Andersen, P and Figenschou, A. (1999)   How does  activity maintain dendritic spines  Nature Neuroscience, 2, pp. 5-7

(8)  Rusakov, D. et al (1996)  Branching of dendritic spines as a mechanism for controlling synaptic efficacy  Neuroscience, 75, pp. 315-23

(9)  Fischer et al, (1998)  Plasticity in dendritic spines  Neuron, 20, pp. 847-54

(10)  Smith, S. (1999)  Dissecting dendritic dynamics  Science, 283, pp. 1860-1

(11)  Fröhlich, H. (1975)  Dielectric properties of biological materials  Neuron, 20, pp. 847-54

(12)  Goodman, E et al (1995)  Effects of electromagnetic fields on molecules and cells  Int. Rev. Cytol., 158, pp. 279-339

(13)  Hong, F. (1995)  Magnetic field effects on biomolecules, cells and organisms  Biosystems, 36, pp. 187-229

(14)  Dowling, J. (1992)  Neurons and Networks  The Belknap Press

(15)  Lehman, D. et al (1998)  Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states  International Journal of Psycholphysiology, 29, pp. 1-11

(16)  Zeki, S. & Bartels, A (1998)  The asynchrony of consciousness  Proceedings of the Royal Society London B, 265, pp’ 185-200

(17)  Sakai, K & Miyashita, Y (1994)  Visual imagery  Trends in Neuroscience, pp. 287-9

(18)  Tonomi et al (1994)  A measure for brain complexity  Proceedings of the national Academy of Science, 91, pp. 5033-7

Bohm, D. (1980)  Wholeness of the Implicate Order  Routledge & Kegan Paul

Damasio, A. (1994)  Descartes Error  Avon Books

Greene, B. (1999) The Elegant Universe  Norton & Co.

Libet, B. (1985) The role of conscious will in voluntary acyion  Behavioural Brain Science, 8, pp. 529-66

Penrose, R. (1989)  The Emperor’s New Mind  Oxford University Press

Romijn, H. (1997)  About the origin of consciousness  Proceedings Kon. Akad, 100, pp. 181-267

Searle, J. (2000)  Consciousness  Ann. Rev. Neuroscience, 23, pp. 557-8

Smolin, L. (1997)  The Life of the Cosmos  Oxford University Press





Johnjoe McFadden

Professor of Molecular Genetics, University of Surrey

Synchronous Firing and its Influence on the the Conscious Brain’s Electromagnetic Field

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 4, 2002, pp. 23-50

McFadden starts by stating that synchronous firing in the brain correlates with awareness and perception indicating that disturbances in the brain’s electromagnetic field also correlate with these. This field is a representation of neuronal information and its dynamics could be seen as a correlate of consciousness. McFadden views this field as the physical substrata of consciousness. Popper and Libet (1-4) have both suggested that consciousness might derive from am overarching field that could integrate the processing of neurons, but they did not think that this could be any known physical field. At the same time, there has been considerable interest in synchronous firing of neurons (Eckhorn 1988 & 1994) (Gray et al, 1989)(5-7). Awareness has been shown to correlate with the synchrony of firing in the 40-80Hz range, and this may bind together neurons involved in different aspects of the same visual perception, thus creating the unity of consciousness.

The brain’s electromagnetic field is induced by neuron firing, and also the movement of ions involved in the fluctuation of electrical potential along the cell membrane. The structure of the cortex tends to amplify the induced field. Experiments in the olfactory bulb (Freeman, 1991) (Freeman & Schneider, 1982)(8&9) have demonstrated EEG activity in response to sensory stimuli. Information about the stimuli related to the spatial pattern of the EEG amplitude.

The author concludes that the brain contains a highly structured extracellular electromagnetic field. The field is weak with the transmembrane fields being about 3,000 times stronger (Valberg et al, 1997) (10). It is suggested that neurotransmission through gap junctions may be voltage dependent and therefore sensitive to local fields (Draguhn et al, 1998) (Jefferys, 1995) (11&12). However, McFadden prefers to concentrate on the voltage-gated ion channels in the cell membranes, because their role is better understood.

Synchonous firing is thought to due to a large number of spatially distributed neurons (Lopes da Silva, 1998)(13). It is thought that many millions of neurons could be influenced by such firing. McFadden claims evidence for neuron communication via the electromagnetic field. The medical use of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is taken to indicate the sensitivity of the brain to weak electromagnetic fields, and as this has impacts on behaviour, it is argued to impact neuronal computation and neuronal function (Chan & Nicholson, 1986) (Jefferys, 1981) (Gluckman et al, 1996) (14-16). Even when fields are weaker than the surrounding noise, they can modulate neurons (Douglas et al, 1993) (17). The brain’s electromagnetic field is argued to hold the same information as the neuron firing patterns. The widespread of the electomagnetic field would help to explain the unity of consciousness.

Clusters of neurons in the visual cortex have been shown to fire in synchrony in response to particular stimuli (Eckhorn, 1988 & 1994)(5&6), (Gray et al, 1989).(7) With insects, destruction of synchronous firing has been shown to reduce the ability to discriminate between stimuli. There is indirect evidence for the correlation between synchronous firing and attention and awareness in humans (Miltner et al, 1999) (Rodriguez et al, 1999) (Srinivasan et al, 1999)(18-20). The olfactory system of rabbits shows that the sensory information is encoded in the spatial pattern of the EEG, and therefore of the electromagnetic field. This correlation also reflected what a particular smell meant to the rabbit, when it had been trained to associate particular things with a smell. This suggested that the shape of the electromagnetic field could be related to perception and meaning. This is taken to suggest that consciousness is related to the electromagnetic field. Where there is habituation with a process and therefore less conscious activity there is a reduction in synchronous firing, so loss of awareness correlates with reduced disturbance in the brain’s electromagnetic field. The theory predicts that only activity that acts on the motor neurons is conscious. This is testable, although there is no direct evidence. The EEG shows that activity increases during creative thinking, declines with sleep but revives with REM dreaming (Molle et al, 1996) (21), so the amount of conscious activity correlates with the amount of electromagnetic activity.

The high conductivity of the cerebral fluid in the brain ventricles makes the brain into a kind of Faraday’s cage, insulating it from external electrical fields. However, it is much easier for magnetic fields to penetrate the brain and other tissues. Moving magnetic fields, such as those used in TMS do produce effects in the brain.

The Function of Consciousness
McFadden sides with those who argue that consciousness must have a function or evolution would not have selected for it. Field effects that had an advantageous effect on the performance of ion channels would have been selected for. Mcfadden thinks that there is information transfer between neurones during synchronous firing.  He proposes that the neural circuits involved in conscious and unconscious activity differ in their sensitivity to the electromagnetic field. The conscious will is claimed to be our experience of the electromagnetic field. He thinks that consciousness is not actually the electromagnetic field, but its ability to transmit information to neurones. He also points out the difficulty of trying to perform two conscious tasks or a conscious and unconscious task at the same time. The two interfere with each other, while unconscious multi-tasking is possible.

Consciousness is required for the laying down of long-term memories and for most learning. The cemi field theory conceives that the electromagnetic field in the brain fine tunes the probabilities of neuron firings. The affected neurons may be part of large connected assemblies, and this leads to memory and learning. In simulated networks non-synaptic neuronal interactions via the eelctromagnetic field and also gap junctions enhance learning (Aronsson and Liljenstrom, 2001)(22). Modulation of long term potentiation by electomagnetic fields has also been demonstrated in vitro in rat hippocampal slices (Bawin et al, 1984)(23).

Freewill
The author claims that free will is the subjective experience of the influence of the cemi field on neurons. However, the influence of the cemi field is seen as entirely deterministic. The fluctuations in the field that are capable of modulating the firing of neurons would all be generated by changing patterns of electrical activity, while the neurons themselves induce the field. The author admits that there might be some element of random quantum fluctuations in the field, but this randomness is unsuitable for producing free will.
 
The author, in common with others in consciousness studies, tries to have it both ways at this point. The functioning of the brain is claimed to be entirely deterministic, but something called ‘will’ is active in driving our conscious actions. This appears to be a clear a contradiction, since the whole idea of will is an agent which initiates something of its own accord.

The cemi theory might be seen as a near miss in terms of trying to provide a plausible explanation of consciousness. The author could have said that consciousness was a fundamental property of electrical charge, or individual charged particles, or the photons that intermediate it, thus making it a primitive or a brute fact of the universe. But he does not do this. He says that our conscious will is our experience of the influence of the cemi field. This seems to raise a host of questions and contradictions. If the cemi field isn’t conscious itself, who or what is experiencing it’s influence. This suggests a dualistic non-physical entity that experiences the action of the field. Even if we are happy with this concept it is not clear why this particular set of electromagnetic fields should produce this experience for this entity.
 
Like many before him, Mcfadden suddenly declares by fiat that one particular part of the otherwise ordinary material of the brain produces consciousness. Again, it is reasonable to say that evolution selected for a particular type of field that could fine tune the neurons, but the additional production of a feeling of free will, which is false has no demonstrable value. The author’s apparent need to stay within the deterministic fold appears to rob the theory of all explanatory value.

References:-

(1)  Popper, K and Eccles, J. (1977)  The Self and its Brain  Springer International

(2)  Popper, K. et al (1993)  A discussion of the mind-brain problem  Theor Med, 14, pp. 167-80

(3)  Libet, B. (1994)  A testable theory of mind-brain interaction..Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1 (1) pp. 119-26

(4)  Libet, B. (1996)  Conscious mind as a field  Journal of Theoretical Biology, 178, pp. 223-6

(5)  Eckhorn et al (1988)  Coherent oscillations  Biol. Cybern, 60, pp. 121-30

(6)  Eckhorn, R. (1994)  Oscillatory and non-oscillatory synchronisations in the visual cortex  Prog. Brain Res, 102, pp. 405-26

(7)  Gray et al (1989)  Oscillatory responses in cat visual cortex  Nature, 338, pp. 334-7

(8)  Freeman, W. & Schneider, W. (1982)  Changes in spatial patterns of rabbit olfactory EEG  Pyschophysiology, 19, pp.44-56

(9)  Freeman, W. (1991)  The physiology of perception  Scientific American, February, pp. 78-85

(10)  Valberg et al, (1997)  Can low-level electrical and magnetic fields cause biological effects

(11)  Draguhn et al (1998)  Electrical coupling in the hippocampus  Nature, 394. pp. 343-61

(12)  Jefferys, J. (1995)  Non-synaptic modulation of neuronal activity  Physiolog. Review, 75, pp. 689-723

(13)  Lopes da Silva (1998)  Dynamics of EEGs as signals of neuronal populations  in Electroencephalography: basic principles  ed. E. Niefermeyer & F. Lopes da Silva

(14)  Chan, C. & Nicholson, C. (1986)  Modulation by electric fields of activity in the cerebellum  Journal of Physiology, 371, pp. 89-114

(15)  Jefferys, J. (1981) Influences of electric fields in hippocampal slices  Journal of Physiology, 319, pp. 143-52

(16)  Gluckman et al (1996)  Electric field suppression in hippocampal slices Journal of Neurophysiology, 76, pp. 4202-5

(17)  Douglas et al (1996)  Noise enhancment of information transfer  Nature, 365, pp. 337-40

(18)  Miltner et al (1999) Coherence of gamma band EEG as a basis for learning  Nature, 397, pp. 434-6

(19)  Rodriguez et al, (1996)  Perception’s shadow: Long distance synchronisation of brain activity  Nature, 397, pp. 430-3

(20)  Srinivasan et al, (1999)  Increased synchronisation of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception  Journal of Neuroscience, 19, pp. 5435-48

(21)  Molle et al, (1996)  Enhanced dynamic complexity during creative thinking  Neuroscience Letters, 208, pp. 61-4

(22)  Aronsson, P. & Liljenstrom, H. (2001)  Effects of non-synaptic neuronal interaction on learning  International Journal of Neural Systems, 7, pp. 369-76

(23)  Bawin et al (1984)  Influence of electric fields in the hippocmpal slice  Brain Research 323, pp. 227-37

Block, N. (1991)  Troubles with functionalism  in The Nature of Mental States  ed D. Rosenthal  Oxford University Press

Block, N. (1995)  On a confusion about a function of consciousness  Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18, pp. 227-47

Chalmers, D. (1995a) Absent qualia, dancing qualia, fading qualia  in Conscious Experience  ed. T. Metzinger  Imprint Academic

Chalmers, D. (1995b)  Facing up to the problem of consciousness  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, (3) pp. 200-19

McFadden, J. (2000)  Quantum Evolution  Harper Collins

Nagel, T. (1974) What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 435-50

Penrose, R. (1995) Shadows of the Mind  Oxford University Press

Searle, J. (1980)  Minds, brains and programmes  Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 3, pp. 417-57

Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind  MIT Press

Aronsson, P. & Lilenstrom, H (2001)  Effects of non-synaptic neuronal interaction  Biosystems, 63, pp. 43-56

Block, N. (1991)  Troubles with functionalism  in the Nature of Mental States  ed. D. Rosenthal  Oxford University Press

Block, N. (1995)  On a confusion about a function of consciousness  Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18, pp. 227-47





Johnjoe McFadden

Professor of Molecular Genetics, University of Surrey

The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi) Field Theory

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 8, 2002, pp. 45-60

The author’s core claim is that consciousness is the component of the brain’s electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neurons, and thus communicates its information content to the outside world. He proposes that field theories of consciousness are attractive because they provide a solution to the binding problem. He thinks that the brain demonstrates an electromagnetic field that influences brain function through voltage-gated ion channels that are sensitive to the electromagnetic field. Information flows from neurons into the electromagnetic field and from there in more integrated form back into the neurons. McFadden sees this as the physical substrata of consciousness.
 
It is suggested that this processing in the electromagnetic field provided an evolutionary advantage. The field is experienced as consciousness, and is able to handle such concepts as self, meaning and number. It is suggested that these type of concepts can only be processed holistically. This information is communicated to the outside world via motor neurons, and only the part of the field related to motor neurons is conscious. This includes speech and memory, memory being something that may later be reported via the use of motor neurons.
 
The rest of the electromagnetic field is not related to reportable information, and in the theory it is divorced from consciousness. The conscious component of the electromagnetic field is defined as that information which is downloaded to the motor neurons. The rest of the field is seen as unavailable to introspection and therefore to reportable consciousness.
 
The Hard Problem
McFadden attempts to answer those critics who say that the cemi field theory does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. The author feels that information needs to be encoded within a physical substrata and the nature of that substrata is a fundamental question about consciousness. 

Neuronal signals involve the movements of ions rather than electrons. The information cannot be encoded in the ions, which move perpendicular to the cell membrane, and not in the necessary direction for information flow in the neuron. The information carrier in the neuron is the action potential, here seen as being an electromagnetic field. The author argues that even if we see consciousness as a property of neurons, the electromagnetic field still has to be the substrata of consciousness. The author argues that conscious experience is what complex information encoded in an electromagnetic field feels like from the inside. McFadden seems to go down the Chalmers route of seeing information and awareness as two aspects of the same physical thing. He takes the example of space and time as being two aspects of the same thing.

References:-

Block, N. (1995)  On a confusion about the function of consciousness  Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18, (2) pp. 227-47

Chalmers, D. (1995)  Facing up to the problem of consciouisness  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, (3) pp. 200-19

Libet, B. (1993)  The neural time factor in conscious and unconsciosu events  Ciba Found Symp. 174, pp. 123-46

Libet, B. (1994)  A testable field-theory of mind-brain interaction  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1, (1) pp. 119-26

Libet, B. (1996)  Conscious mind as a field  Journal of Theoretical Biology, 178, pp. 223-6

Libet, B. et al (1983)  Time of conscious intentoin to act  Brain, 106 (3) pp. 623-42

McFadden, J. (2002)  Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain’s electromagnetic field  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (4), pp. 23-50

McFadden, J. (2000)  Quantum Evolution  Harper Collins

Nagel, T. (1974)  What is it like to be a bat?  Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 435-50





Susan Pockett

Dept. of Physics, University of Auckland

Difficulties with the Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 4, 2002, pp. 51-56

Although Susan Pockett sees herself as a supporter of electromagnetic theories of consciousness, this paper concentrates mainly on various difficulties with the theory. She starts by pointing out the non-constant relationship between brain-generated electromagnetic fields and consciousness. The author suggests that qualia are identical with as yet undefined spatio-temporal patterns in the electromagnetic field. She disagrees with McFadden in thinking that consciousness has nothing to do with the electromagnetic field coupling with brain tissue, nor with an ability to influence motor neurons. She points to the existence of fields that can do this without producing consciousness. Instead she looks for consciousness in the spatial structure of the field. In this she is influenced by Freeman & Baird (1987) Freeman & Grajski, 1987 and Freeman & Viana Dio Prisco, 1986) (1-3), which showed that the electromagnetic patterns in a rabbits brain varied according to what sort of odour the olfactory bulb was detecting. Spatial pattern than rather amplitude, frequency or phase is claimed to be the important factor.

The author goes on to discuss the lack of correspondence between electromagnetic patterns measurable on the scalp and conscious sensations (Freeman, 1999)(4). Freeman himself concluded that the electromagnetic field was only an epiphenomena, but Pocket thinks this is an indication that the mind wanders away from the conscious subject of attention. Pockett is also worried by the way in which the elctromagnetic field changes as it evolves. She touches on the well-known Libet experiment with readiness potentials, seeming to indicates the lack of conscious effect on actions. She does not question the trivial nature of the actions involved in the experiment, or pause to discuss whether more important actions considered over the longer term might be different. In this she is no different from the majority of commentators, who seem happy to base their view of consciousness on an experiment related to trivial actions. In Pockett’s case she does not even discuss Libet’s veto idea. With these gaps in the discussion it becomes hard to take the subsequent views of consciousness too seriously. The author, however, sees this as an argument against McFadden, who attributes a causitive role to the elctromagnetic field, although needless to say this has to have a deterministic basis. However, having spent most of the paper apparently attacking the electromagnetic field idea, the author confusingly rounds off by pointing out that a growing number of experimental observations show a correlation between synchronous firing of neurons and conscious activity, and the absence of consciousness in the presence of non-synchronous firing (Eckhorn et al, 1988 & 1993) (Eckhorn, 1994) (Engel et al, 1991) (Fries et al, 1997) (Gray et al, 1989) (Kreiter & Singer, 1996) (5-11).

References:-

(1)  Freeman, W. & Baird, B.  Relation of olfactory EEG to behaviour: spatial analysis  Behavioral Neuroscience, 101, pp. 393-408

(2)  Freeman, W & Grajski, K. (1987)  Relation of olfactory EEG to behaviour: factor analysis  Behavioral Neuroscience, 101, pp. 766-77

(3)  Freeman & Viana di Prisco, G. (1986)  Relation of olfactory EEG to behaviour: time series  Behavioral Neuroscience, 10o, pp. 753-63

(4)  Freeman, W. (1999)  How Brains Make Up Their Minds  Weidenfeld & Nicholson

(5) Eckhorn et al, (1988)  Coherent oscillations  Biological Cybernetics, 60, pp. 121-30

(6)  Eckhorn et al, 1993  High frequency oscillations in primary visual cortex  Neuroreport, 4, pp. 243-6

(7)  Eckhorn, R. (1994)  Oscillatory synchronisations in the visual cortex  Progress in Brain Research, 102, pp. 405-26

(8)  Engel et al, 1991  Synchronisation of oscillatory neuronal responses  Science & proceedings of the Natioanl Academy of Sciences

(9)  Fries et al (1997)  Synchronisation of oscillatory responses in visual cortex  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 94, pp. 12699-704

(10)  Gray et al, (1989)  Oscillatory responses in cat visual cortex  Nature, 338, pp. 334-7

(11)  Kreier, A & Singer, W. (1996)  Synchronisation of neural responses in the visual cortex  Journal of Neuroscience, 16, pp. 2381-96

Libet, B. et al (1983)  Time of conscious intention to act  Brain, 106, pp. 623-42

McFadden, J. (2000)  Quantum Evolution Harper Collins

McFadden, J. (2002)  Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain’s electromagnetic field  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, (4)

Pockett, S. (1999)  Anesthesia and the electrophysiology of auditory consciousness  Consciousness and Cognition, 8, pp. 45-61

Pockett, S. (2000)  The Nature of Consciousness  Iuniverse Ltd

Pockett, S (2002a)  On subjective back referral  Consciousness and Cognition

Pockett, S. (2002b)  Facilitation, backward referral and quantum free will  Consciousness and Cognition

Pockett, S & Tan, S (2002)  monitors of anesthesia  Anesthesia and Analgesia





The Nonlocality of Mind

Chris
Clarke

Faculty of Mathematical Studies, University of Southampton

Journal  of Consciousness Studies, 2, No 3, 1995, pp. 231-40

The article points out that human awareness is dominated by the visual, which relates to space, but claims that thoughts are non-local. It argues that the mind is non-spatial. The concept of the non-spatial is held to be compatible with physics, which contains non-locality. Mind is seen as the key aspect of the universe.

Clarke distances himself from writers who locate mind in higher dimensional space. He does not see mind as extended, and he does not consider it is in space at all. He sees the experiental as the starting point for the study of mind, where the primary data is found. The existence of mind is taken as axiomatic because without mind there is no person and it might be added no conscious registration of data either.





Are our spaces made of words?

Jonathan Edwards

University College London

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 63-83

The author’s concept of consciousness appears to be closely aligned to the ideas of David Bohm. Edwards proposes that the elements of the universe are best viewed as dynamic processes that transfer and in some cases experience ‘pure’ or ‘active information, when they interact with one another. He accepts the conventional view that what we experience is a model produced by our brain, rather than the external world as it actually is. He refers to evidence (1. Smythies, 2003) that our spatial experience is based on models or maps that are based on selected aspects of the external world.

In contrast to a lot of mainstream consciousness studies, Edwards takes the view that there is something in the brain that has access to already-interpreted information, such as the mapping of external events, memory and emotional responses. In fact, in his own words, he is bringing the homunculus back into the mind, in defiance of the rulings of Dennett. Edwards concept of the homunculus is something receiving inputs, not from the external world, but from internal maps and information. The brain is seen as having maps in many areas, and he takes the view that there is probably no single place in the brain where everything comes together.

Edwards sees the interaction of fundamental as the type of event that produces active information. As an example of this, radio waves being diffracted by buildings are seen as an indivisible process distributed in spacetime. Nothing pushes or pulls. The process just happens according to the fundamental law. It is a pattern of probabilities that something will occur, and as such represents pure information, or what Bohm and Hiley called active information.

Edwards goes from the idea of pure or active information to the suggestion that human subjectivity is itself a fundamental process. He looks for something in the brain that could be regarded as such a fundamental process. Modern physics suggests the oscillation of quanta as a fundamental process. He sees the best candidates for this as being an elastic phonons in the dendritic trees of neurons with a wave length close to the distance between synapses, and coupled to the electrical potential across the cell membrane. A recent study of neuronal membrane excitation (2. Heimburg & Jackson, 2005) suggests that this is dependent on coupling to an elastic wave for the propagation of the action potential. The author suggests that anaesthetics decouple the elastic wave and in doing this remove consciousness. In this model, consciousness in the form of the elastic wave, is seen as crucial to neuronal function.

Edwards admits that while this may serve as a theory of consciousness, it still does not actually solve the binding problem. We may be conscious of a circle, and we may be conscious of blue, but how do these two qualia become integrated into a blue circle? Edwards suggests that this integration may be similar to the integration of a series of words into an overall meaning. Unfortunately, this process is also not properly understood. One suggestion is that there is a pattern of electrical perturbations in the dendrites that is a code for producing an integrated experience. It is suggested that this would involve phonons in the neuronal dendrites.

In summary, the active information in the brain forms the basis of the appearance of the world to us in our subjective experience. The exchange of active information in the brain is determined by fundamental processes, which can be observed to be governed by the laws of physics. The fundamental process may handle bits of the active information in an analogous manner to the way that words are handled in a language.

References:-

1.) Smythies, J. (2003)  -  Space, time & consciousness  -  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, (3), pp. 47-56

2.) Heimburg, T. & Jackson, A. (2005)  -  On soliton propagation in biomembranes and nerves  -  Proceedings of National Academy of Science USA, 102, pp. 9790-5