|
|
Perception and action paths
Cortical
visual systems for perception and action
David Milner & Melvyn
Goodale,
University of Durham and University of Western Ontario
In:-
Perception,
Action and Consciousness – Eds. Gangopadhyay, N., Madary, M. &
Spicer, F.
Keywords: ventral stream, dorsal stream, Milner & Goodale, Aglioti, Biegstraaten
The authors had previously proposed a model in which there are
distinct
paths for vision for perception and vision for action. This involves to
pathways the ventral and the dorsal streams. The authors understand the
distinct streams in terms of their output rather than their input. It is
claimed that initial visual information is transformed in different ways
for
different purposes. The ventral stream is argued to turn inputs into
representations of the characteristics of objects including their
spatial
position. Both conscious and unconscious perceptions are here thought to
be
processed in the ventral stream. The dorsal stream is seen as guiding
bodily
actions such as reaching and grasping objects. The ventral stream is
seen as
providing our subjective experience of the world, but not the basis for
physical action. It is accepted that perception can influence action, in
fact
this is one of the things it evolved to do, but the connection is argued
to be
indirect and flexible, and to involve memory and planning.
The
authors
distinguish between movement and action. For them movement refers to the
simple
physical movement of an arm or a leg etc., while action involves
planning and
possibly more than one movement. It is interesting in this context that
the
Libet and similar experiments that are taken as an absolute refutation
of the
existence of freewill refer exclusively to single movements, and not to
the
planning of actions involving multiple movements. The authors argue that
the
ventral stream is only involved in the planning of actions to deal with
goal-objects
that have been perceived. The actual implementation of the action
depends on
the dorsal stream.
The
authors refer to evidence for the importance of the dorsal stream in
control of
action such as the acts of reaching or grasping. Such actions are
impaired in
patients with damage to the dorsal stream. Furthermore patients who have
damage
to the ventral stream, so that they cannot identify object, but who do
have
damage to the dorsal stream, can reach and grasp the objects that they
cannot
identify. This is similar to the phenomenon of blindsight, which is also
thought to result from the distinction between the ventral and the
dorsal
stream.
The ways in which subjects are prone to visual illusions is
also
argued to support this distinction between the ventral and the dorsal
functions. In particular tests subjects misjudge the length of objects,
but
when they reach to grasp these objects they correctly estimate their
lengths.
The author's findings have proved controversial within neuroscience. One
criticism has been that the distinction in D.F.'s behaviour has not been
between ventral and dorsal processing but between tasks where viewing is
performed from the point-of-view of the subject (egocentric) and where
it is
based on a separate reference point (allocentric). However, the authors
argue
that the test quoted in fact showed the subject D.F. using her dorsal
functioning to report on her perceptual judgement.
The authors argue
that
perception and action evolved to perform separate tasks in different
ways.
Action or grasping requires an accurate estimate of the size of objects,
whereas for perception it may be more useful to have an estimate of the
relative size of more than one remote object, preserved in time to allow
the
recognition of objects and their relationships. A study by Aglioti et al
(1.
1995) showed that a grip aperture in a disc was less subject to a
standard
illusion when it had to be grasped than when the object was merely
viewed. A
study by Biegstraaten et al (2. 2007) showed no reason to think that
perceived
size guided how we grasped an object.
The
authors think that their model suggests that the dorsal-based vision for
action
works only in real time. A study on the patient D.F. by Goodale et al
(3.
1994a) showed that while she could grasp correctly when the object was
present,
she could not remember the correct grasp soon after the object was
removed,
indicating that working memory was not functioning in this respect. The
authors
accept that there will not be complete immunity to visual illusion and
some
element of illusion could come through from the visual cortex prior to
the
division of the dorsal and the ventral stream. Particular types of
illusion
arise in the early cortex rather than the ventral stream.
It is also
admitted that more unpractised actions may require cognitive involvement
and
therefore be less dependent on the dorsal stream, and require more
perceptual
involvement. Control appears to pass to the dorsal stream once the
movement
becomes more practised. A study by Gonzalez et al (4. 2006) showed that
unfamiliar actions where subject to the effect of visual illusions in
the same
manner as visual perception, but in contrast to familiar actions. The
authors argue
that some studies that have suggested that grasping type are subject to
illusions only reflect the fact that equipment involved in the
experiment has
rendered the action required unfamiliar, and therefore subject to
illusion. The
Gonzalez study also showed that the right hand was less prone to
illusions,
presumably because it is more practised in most subjects. In studies
involving
patients pointing at objects, the performance of those with ventral
stream
damage deteriorated when they had to remember a position. This is
ascribed to
reliance on the dorsal stream. In contrast a patient with damage to the
dorsal stream
showed improved performance when having to remember a position, because
as time
passed they relied more on the perceptual/ventral stream.
References:- 1.)
Aglioti et al - Illusions deceive the eye but not the
hand -
Current Biology, 5, (1995), pp.679-85 2.) Biegstraaten, M. et al
(2007) -
Grasping the Muller-Lyer illusion
- Experimental Brain Research,
176, pp.497-503 3.) Goodale, M. et al - Differences in visual
grasping
movements - Neuropsychologia, 32, (1994a), pp.154-6 4.) Gonzalez
et al (2006) -
Planning and control of action - Journal of Neurophysiology, 95,
pp.3496-501
|
|