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ProtophenomenaProtophenomenaProtophenomena and their physical correlates Bruce MacLennan Journal of Cosmology, 2011, vol. 14 Keywords: consciousness, self, neurons MacLennan says that he is discussing phenomenal consciousness or subjective awareness, the hard problem raised by David Chalmers. This is approached through the concept of 'protophenomena' described as 'elementary units of embodied subjectivity'. MacLennan suggests that the apparent continuity of consciousness can be broken down into smaller units, and that these units may correlate with the response activity of single neurons, an idea which appears compatible with current neuroscience. The author argues that given that neurons do not vary between cortices, different sensory qualities are likely to derive from different neural connections. McLennan speculates as to the location of what he calls 'activity sites' that might support the suggested 'protophenomena' units. After some discussion, the author appears to favour a proposal by another researcher, Norman D. Cook. The suggestion here is that the openings of the cell membrane, as the action potential passing along the neuron, breaks the barrier between the 'cellular self' or neuronal self and the external world. This is suggested to lead to an increased correlation between the external and internal states of the neuron and an 'increase in the mutual information' between the interior and exterior of the neuron. There is a problem here with the special role given to the extracellular space. With the exception of some electromagnetic field theories of consciousness, which are not being proposed here, the extracellular space is given a relatively limited role in the brain's processing. The so-called opening of the cell is an opening to ions rather than anything more sweeping or mysterious, and it is not clear why such a common place physical fluctuation should suddenly be responsible for inducing consciousness. The theory speaks of the correlation between the internal and external areas, but if we crunch this down into what neuroscience actually describes, it is merely the fluctuation in electrical potential. The same applies to the vague reference to mutual exchange of information. The complex processing that might reasonably be thought to have some correlation with consciousness is within the neurons and between them in the form of neurotransmitters, with the extracellular mainly limited to assisting the fluctuation in potential across the cell membrane. In the fullness of time, it may transpire that this is too narrow a view, and that the extracellular area does play a larger role. But given that this is not at the moment the view of mainstream neuroscience, we need some developed argument from the author if this enlarged role for the extracellular region is to carry conviction. The process suggested here by the author is referred to as 'protocognition', which seems on reflection to be merely saying that action potentials lie at the basis of cognition, but not why this should involve or lead to consciousness. Further, the neuron is supposed to comprise a 'self' that becomes aware as a result of opening to its immediate exterior. But while recent studies do point to neurons that select for particular complex experiences such as recognising various people, faces or places, the concept of the 'self' does seem to be linked to more widespread prefrontal activity organising the distinction between the body and the external environment and its history as recorded in the long-term memory. Sensory inputs look to be selected for by individual neurons, but studies show that concentration on sensory inputs may in fact lead to reduced awareness of the self, which in turn correlates to lower activity in the prefrontal. |
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