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Quantum computer/neurocomputer - Hameroff
Neurocomputer & quantum computer
The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer
Stuart Hameroff
Cognitive Science, 31, (2007) pp. 1034-45
http://blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?0953-816X
Keywords: quantum computing, microtubules, Max Tegmark, objective reduction
This paper is a reply to an
article published by Cognitive Science in 2006 criticising the
Penrose-Hameroff model of quantum consciousness from the point of view
of mainstream consciousness theory (1. Litt et al, 2006). The
criticisms make depressing reading for any serious student of
consciousness. Not only do they do nothing to plug any explanatory gaps
in the mainstream ideas of the previous decade, but they retain a
remarkably casual attitude towards any evidence for or against theories
that deviate from the mainstream. In much of his paper, Hameroff merely
reiterates the long standing proposals of Orch OR, and here we will
concentrate on the specific point on which he counter attacks the Litt
et al paper.
Litt et al advance the now ancient argument that
microtubules are widespread in organisms, and if neurons produced
consciousness as a function of their microtubules, then large parts of
many diverse organisms including plants would be conscious. As many
times before, Hameroff points out that neuronal dendritic microtubules
differ from other microtubules in several ways. They are much more
densely packed than in other cells, and are unique in having mixed
polarity, with short microtubules formed into anti-parallel networks
(2. Woolf, 1998). Also, the 17 different types of tubulin protein
subunits found in neuronal microtubules are more numerous than those
found in other microtubules (3. Lee et al, 1986), and Hameroff thinks
that this may be connected to information processing.
Another golden
oldie trundled out by Litt et al is that if Penrose’s objective
reduction (OR) were to be true, quantum theory would have to be
rewritten. Many in neuroscience and philosophy seems to regard this as
a strong argument against Penrose, apparently oblivious of the multiple
problems in existing quantum theory, including incompatibility with
relativity, lack of description of underlying reality, and lack of
clear understanding of the collapse of the wave function.
Litt et al
revisit the exchange between Max Tegmark (4.) and Hagan, Hameroff and
Tuszynski (5.) at the beginning of this decade. They accept the
possibility of longer decoherence times than those claimed by Tegmark,
but interpret this as only applying to individual tubulin subunits,
which are too small to be significant for neural processing. Hameroff
counters that Orch OR applies to bundles of dendritic microtubules, and
extends to other neurons via gap junctions. Separately to this Hameroff
indicates recent studies that show quantum correlations between
electrons between neurotransmitters and receptor proteins. (6. Brookes
et al, 2006) (7. Kang & Green, 1970), (8. Nichols, 1986), (9.
Snyder & Merill, 1965).
Litt et al claim that biochemical
explanations of anesthesia have surpassed quantum mechanical versions.
Hameroff counters by stating that anesthetic gases act via quantum
London forces in hydrophobic pockets in receptor and other proteins to
inhibit electron resonance. These are quantum mechanical rather than
biochemical processes.
Hameroff also mentions a more recent
extension of the Orch OR theory that claims that the precise global
nature of the gamma synchrony in the brain can only be accounted for by
long range quantum correlation (10. Freeman & Vitiello, 2006).
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