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Quantum Mind Blog

'Once we have bitten the quantum apple, our loss of innocence is permanent.' - R. Shankar

RECENT BLOGS:-
9 March 2010:- The Quantum Brain - Useful discussion of quantum activity in protein
7 March 2010: - Freewill
1 March 2010: - The World in Your Head - Argues against the brain as computer concept
22 February 2010: - Indeterminism in neurobiology
17 February 2010: Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem
8 February 2010: QUANTUM COHERENCE IN PROTEIN AT ROOM TEMPERATURE
05/10/2010: Ionic wave propagation along microtubules
05/02/2010: The structure of water
04/02/2010: Stable microtubules
02/02/2010: Pseudoscepticism - No way to do science - the problem of the word quantum
02/02/2010: Gamma synchrony and the neurophysics of consciousness
27/01/2010: Adhesive molecules and the cortical quantum entangled network
23/01/2010: Consciousness not yet explained
23/01/2010: Neuroligins and neurexins

9 March 2010
QUANTUM ACTIVITY IN PROTEIN
The 21 st century may be the century of protein, particularly if we are going to make much progress in understanding organisms in this period.

In this respect Jeffrey Satinover's book, 'Quantum Brain' is mainly interesting for its discussion of quantum activity in protein.

The best section of this book is the discussion of the quantum aspects of protein, the basic building blocks of organic matter. A protein is a string of a hundred or more amino acid molecules. The amino acids are attached to one another by bridges called peptides, so that the protein is a macromolecule. Each amino acid has a unique shape, and a unique distribution of electric charge. For a protein to carry out its necessary functions within an organism, it must fold in a precise manner, at or very close to, the energy minima.

The problem with this system is that there can be trillions of similar ways for a protein to fold. Proteins can assume a very large number of conformational states, with a large number of energy minima. Despite this huge number of possible states, proteins can, within seconds, find the correct conformations and energy minima, which are also the most functional configurations.

There is, as yet, no clear indication as to how this is to be achieved. Random searching for a minimum energy conformation would take longer than the life of the universe to reach a solution. The position is not much better for supercomputers, where despite years of generous funding, it has proved impossible to calculate the minimum energy configuration for even a short chain of amino acids. This is known as the protein-folding problem. DNA encodes the primary structure of the protein, which is the sequence of the amino acids. At a secondary stage, the amino acid chains are formed into particular shapes, such as helices. At the tertiary stage, sections of helices and other shapes are brought together, and folded into a particular configuration of electric charges. It is this last stage of folding that constitutes the protein-folding problem. Satinover argues that the problem of protein folding is similar to the means, by which spin glasses reach alignment, with a huge number of axes, along which protein must flip.

Satinover explains that to achieve what they do proteins use quantum features. Some of the electrons in the protein are in a wave or superposed state, with the wave extending over a considerable distance through the protein. This is referred to as tunnelling, with the wave form of the electron able to penetrate into regions that the point-particle form of the electron cannot reach. This electron tunnelling can be exceptionally sensitive to minor couplings. In helical structures in particular, the influence of quantum tunnelling falls off only slowly with distance. The tunnelling of electrons triggers conformational changes in protein, and further to this, conformational changes in protein trigger yet more quantum tunnelling. Water is vital to living organisms, and it also exhibits tunnelling between molecules. The tunnelling process orders water into chiral (left and right-handed) clusters, which play an important role in protein folding. Tunnelling makes low-energy states more accessible within protein, and this probably proved to be an adaptive advantage, from an early stage in evolution. Studies by Peter Wolynes at the Centre of Biophysics and Computational Biology and also at the National Centre for Supercomputing Applications have simulated the tunnelling process in protein, showing that theories of spin glasses can be applied to the protein-folding problem, and also showing that tunnelling makes systems more efficient, particularly in the search for minimum energy levels. The advantage of quantum processing is that an electron can simultaneously search many routes for the most efficient route.

The existence of quantum tunnelling in protein raises the question of the vulnerability of quantum processes to decoherence. In general, the movement of molecules as a function of heat serves to disrupt quantum tunnelling. However, it is claimed that the opposite is true in the case of protein. Proteins also exhibit phonons that represent travelling, classical, mechanical coherence in protein. These are claimed to enhance tunnelling distance. This represents a mutually reinforcing relationship between classical, mechanical vibrations and quantum activity, so as to enhance short-lived coherences. Decoherence of superpositions may happen rapidly, but may collapse to just the right classical state, which also puts the protein into the right condition for the next burst of quantum coherence. Studies performed a number of years after Satinover's book look to have demonstrated just such a pattern of decline and resurgence in coherence, where quantum coherence has been demonstrated in photosynthetic proteins.

7 March 2010
FREEWILL
The anti-freewill establishment never miss a chance to emphasise the supremacy of their view. A perfectly reasonable article in the February 27 issue of 'New Scientist' about the predictability of passengers' usage of transport systems has to start with a paragraph on the theme that we think we are free spirits but we aren't. In fact, we really don't need an article in a science magazine to tell us that travel patterns are predictable - you only need to be a commuter to do that. The real point is that the bar is set much higher than many people realise for freewill denial. It does not just mean that people's actions are fairly predictable, it means that they never make a free choice at any time. The commuter as free agent never decides to get off the train one station earlier to get a cappucino or see his girl friend.

1 March 2010
THE WORLD IN YOUR HEAD - MECHANISM OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
The author, Steven Lehar makes a good case against the AI/computer model of the brain. He outlines the difficulty computers have with visual perception. Computers can detect edges, which are also the first stage in processing in the brain, but have difficulty in turning this into useful visual information. The problem is that they detect too many features, not just the edges that determine the shape and volume of objects, but a mass of less important data referring to shadows, texture etc, without the ability that biological vision has to determine the important features.

Depth and three-dimensional processing appears to be a particular problem for computers/robots, as demonstrated by the difficulty that robots find in navigating an environment of irregular objects. Lehar traces this to the fact that the retinal image in biological vision is two-dimensional, with the three dimensional depth apparently inserted as a result of cortical processing. It is argued that the brain operates a spatial algorithm, in order to produce this three-dimensional image. Computer technology does not yet appear to have matched this aspect of biological processing.

Lehar goes on to discuss a number of well-known visual examples that demonstrate the problems of a bottom-up system supposedly driven by the examination of individual visual edges. He discusses the well-known image of a Dalmatian dog against a spotty background. Much of the edges of the dog are missing, so local information does not allow the observer to distinguish the dog, but when the picture is taken as a whole, the dog is clearly distinguished. With the equally well known Kaniza triangle, there are only three PacMan figures and no interconnecting edges on the printed paper, but both edges and an area of increased whiteness are perceived by the observer. Here again there is something which cannot be created bottom up, but needs to be created by an overall view. Further to this, Lehar discusses the problem of invariant perception, by which the brain perceives an object as the same thing even though viewed from different angles and in different lights. This too cannot be understood in terms of individual edges, but needs to come from some form of global view. If it was done using individual ages there would need to be an algorithm for each possible angle of detection etc. producing a combinatorial explosion, such as would overwhelm any classical form of computing.

Lehar's attempts to explain the difference in performance between computer and biological vision in terms of Gestalt processes, which looks a bit unconvincing given that he also demonstrates, in the case of invariant perception, the enormous amount of processing needed for what the brain does. This is in fact an example of where quantum processing might be able to deal with the processing problems of the brain as conventionally understood.

22 February 2010
INDETERMINISM IN NEUROBIOLOGY
This paper is really an example of something which is all two frequent in consciousness studies, where a researcher makes an assumption about what is being proposed in quantum consciousness theories, and proceeds to attack what has been assumed without making contact with any real theories of quantum consciousness. The paper essentially addresses the wrong problem. It is mainly discussing whether the overall development of the universe and within it of large biological structures is influenced by chance events, as a result of wave function collapses at the quantum level. Unfortunately, this debate is of little interest in respect to quantum consciousness. Early on in his first book, Penrose pointed out that the randomness of the wave function collapse was of little use to mathematical understanding. It was from here that he went on to propose the idea of objective reduction, which is hypothesised to give access to the geometry of spacetime.

The paper's search for chance events in the brain is irrelevant to Penrose's and other versions of quantum consciousness theory. It adopts what is essentially the Tegmark approach to quantum coherence in biological matter, arguing that biological systems are macroscopic, interact with the environment, and by implication therefore decohere and behave in a classical/deterministic manner. This paper was written before Engel et al (2007) and Collini et al (2010) demonstrated the existence of quantum coherence in some proteins, and the latter of the two papers demonstrated coherence at room temperature. However, even when the paper was published in 2005, a discussion of Hameroff's proposals for shielding microtubule protein from decoherence would have seemed relevant.

Another unusual feature is the treatment of the possibility of chance events at the synaptic level. This is not in fact a proposition made by Penrose/Hameroff, where dendritic gap junctions are the focus of attention, but given that it is discussed, it is very surprising that Weber does not mention the fact that only 15-30% of axon potentials result in the synapse firing. However, Danko Georgiev, who is critical of the Hameroff model, has recently proposed that neurotransmitter release could be influenced by coherence extending from microtubules via presynaptic scaffold proteins.

17 February 2010
CONSCIOUSNESS: CREEPING UP ON THE HARD PROBLEM
Our latest review covers this interesting book by Jeffrey Gray, which is worth reading for a number of interesting areas of discussion. It attempts to use aspects of synaesthesia to refute functionalism. It argues that intentionality or meaning arises from unconscious processing, and also that there is no true representation of the external world in the brain. Because of these last two points, it is argued that much of the philosophical baggage of consciousness studies can be left behind, and that discussion of consciousness should be focused purely on qualia.

Gray does not think we yet have an explanation for qualia. He takes the possibility of quantum consciousness, at least in the Penrose form, more seriously than most mainstream investigators, although he argues that it contains no explanation for the selection of particular qualia. Gray's problem with Penrose looks to stem partly from the fact that he only really discusses Hameroff's ideas for implementation in the brain, rather than Penrose's original arguments for looking at the quantum level. The Penrose arguement from the Godel theorem seems to posit a direct link via wave function collapse between particular cognitive processing and the fundamental spacetime level, and this also could apply to the qualia of (mainly visual) perception discussed by Gray.

Gray sees consciousness as being selected for by evolution, because it is causal, but causal in a sense that does not involve agency or freewill. Unconscious systems are claimed to respond to conscious perception, but only in the sense that our brains can respond to a sketch as a reminder, with the sketch having no agency of its own. This part of the discussion seems rather incomplete. Gray has accepted the superficial interpretation of the Libet experiments, which ignores the possible nature of more strategic or deliberative thinking, and has relatively little to say about cognitive processing, the conscious emotional aspects of the brain, or the relationship between these two, which is known to be crucial in determining preferences for action and behaviour.

8 February 2010
QUANTUM COHERENCE IN PROTEIN AT ROOM TEMPERATURE
(under Protein&coherence 2)
A paper in the most recent copy of 'Nature' is a further step in undermining the core argument against quantum consciousness, and might one day be seen as one of the seminal papers of this century, at least for consciousness studies. Work on quantum coherence in photosynthetic proteins was pioneered by Gregory Engel, who published in 'Nature' in 2007, but this dealt with proteins at very low temperatures. He is an enthusiastic supporter of the most recent paper by Elisabetta Collini, which has demonstrated quantum coherence in photosynthetic proteins at room temperature, thus contradicting the 20th century dogma that long-range quantum coherence would decohere in biological systems too rapidly to be relevant to their systems.

The core argument against quantum consciousness relates to the speed of quantum decoherence in biological matter being too quick for coherence to be relevant to processing, particularly neural processing, in such matter. This argument has been substantially undermined by this recent paper.

The work of Collini, Engel and others has focused on the very high level of efficiency of energy transport within some photosynthetic systems, which is itself suggestive of quantum coherence being involved. The photosynthetic proteins studied here occur in low-light conditions, where efficient energy transport would be particularly advantageous. The means by which coherence is sustained in the environment of protein is uncertain, but it is thought that it may involve correlation of motion with the surrounding environment. Engel has suggested that quantum coherence allows a search for the lowest energy state of the photosynthetic complex, and the avoidance of local minima or energy traps.

Perhaps the most surprising thing, is the speed with which this development has been taken up and given prominence at a more popular level, in the form of a useful summary by Kate McAlpine in the ' New Scientist. This includes a suggestion that the work may have relevance to the development of quantum computing, and possibly suggests a change of background attitude to the implications of the coherence in protein debate. None of these papers and commentaries mentions the vexed question of quantum consciousness, but discussion of quantum computing moves us a step in that direction.

5 February 2010
IONIC WAVE PROPAGATION ALONG MICROTUBULES
Satiric and Tuszynski have produced a further model for possible quantum processing in microtubules, quite close to the suggestions of Georgiev. They propose that the charge distribution on the surface of the tubulin subcomponents of microtubules can result in a peak in electrical potential on each of the 13 protofilaments of the microtubule and a corresponding trough in the areas between. The microtubule as a whole is viewed as a 'cable' conducting 13 parallel ionic flows. The flow of ions is postulated to be mainly channelled through valleys in the electrical potential parallel to each protofilament. The model proposed here is that microtubules with brush-like 'tubulin tails' projecting from them and surrounded by solvent ions act as electrical transmission lines. It is suggested that this model could provide some insight into a role for microtubules in information processing within neurons.

05/02/2010
THE STRUCTURE OF WATER
A recent New Scientist article reexamines theories about the structure of water. Although the article itself is not at all related to theories of consciousness, it is apparent that the structure and behaviour of water, which comprises 70% of the brain, may well be relevant to quantum theories of consciousness. The key to understanding water is the interaction of its molecules. These molecules are comprised of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom to give the well known H20 formula. The oxygen atom is left with a negative charge, because only two of its eight electrons bond with the two hydrogen atoms, while the hydrogen atoms are left with a positive charge on each of their protons, after both their single electrons bond with the oxygen atom. Positive and negative charges on opposite sides of the water molecule mean that water molecules are attracted to one another by opposite charges. These bonds are known as hydrogen bonds. These are weaker than the bonds within the molecules, and are constantly breaking and reforming. Traditionally, it has been thought that each water molecule was surrounded by four neighbours arranged in the form of a triangular pyramid. However, recent work has suggested that only about 15% of water is ordered in this form, while 85% of the molecules are more disordered. Ordered structures are suggested to comprise groups of only 50 to 100 molecules, within a sea of more disordered molecules. This hypothesis is disputed, with many scientists arguing that up to 90% of water may have the more ordered structure.

04/02/10
STABLE MICROTUBULES
Another paper by Georgiev, reviewed yesterday, pursues an alternative to the Hameroff model for consciousness based in microtubules. The paper stresses the stability of microtubules in neurons relative to other cells. This is the reason that information processing and consciousness are feasible in neuron microtubules, and it gets rid of the simplistic, but often repeated refutation of Penrose, that we wouldn't just be conscious in the brain, if the theory were true. Georgiev does not think that energy for computing in microtubules could be generated in the way suggested by Hameroff and coworkers, but suggests instead a combination of the electric field and elastic energy stored in the walls of microtubules from the time at which they are assembled.

02/02/2010
PSEUDOSCEPTICISM - NO WAY TO DO SCIENCE - THE PROBLEM OF THE WORD QUANTUM
The modern use or abuse of the word 'quantum' is extremely unfortunate when it comes to trying to discuss theories of quantum consciousness. Two trends are apparent, firstly, the attachment of the word to theories, which do not attempt to establish any very rigorous basis, and may just generate a feel good factor, and secondly an indiscriminate commercial or semi-commercial use. This plays straight into the hands of those who want to confine explanations of consciousness to the classic level, and to scales not below those of a whole neuron. It also favours those who for essentially heritage reasons want to keep consciousness as the preserve of philosophy and psychology, and to shout down any involvement with physics and even at times neuroscience. This is thought to justify labeling any mention of quantum consciousness with words such as hallucinatory and 'flapdoodlery' even where it involves libeling peer-reviewed scientists. Students of consciousness need to hold onto the fact that this is no way to do science, which is based on evidence and its logical interpretation.

One answer to this approach is to apply the label 'pseudoscepticism'. Much use is made of the label 'pseudoscience' when attacking quantum consciousness theories, regardless of the fact that they made be testable proposals derived from known elements of physics and neuroscience. Pseudoscepticism is the rejection of ideas using the pretense of a science based reason, without providing any evidence or rational argument.

02/02/2010
GAMMA SYNCHRONY AND THE NEUROPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In our latest review (under General Articles 4) a paper titled 'The neurophysics of consciousness' by E. Roy John provides useful background evidence for the correlation of the gamma synchrony with consciousness, and the close involvement of thalamo-cortical loops with the gamma synchrony. The author discusses the extension of the synchrony across different modalities and specialisations in the brain, the increase of synchrony in line with selective attention, the existence of synchrony in REM, but not in deep sleep, and the decrease in synchrony as a result of anaesthetic agents.

The author seems to see the gamma synchrony and its involvement with thalamo-cortical links as a possible full answer to consciousness. However, correlation is not identity. In terms of classical physics, it is not clear how even a sychronised electrical potential could give rise to something not found in the rest of nature. For this reason, it seems more likely that the gamma synchrony and its activities in the thalamo-cortical circuits and other areas of the brain are a correlate of some underlying and possibly non-classical process.

27/01/2010
ADHESIVE MOLECULES AND CONTROL OF THE CORTICAL QUANTUM ENTANGLED NETWORK
In a cogprints paper (Danko Georgiev 2) Georgiev proposes a process by which macroscopic quantum coherence could extend between neurons, and by involving a large number of neurons could provide a solution to the binding problem. This is an alternative proposition to the Hameroff idea that quantum coherence extends across neuronal assembles via dendritic gap junctions. Georgiev also thinks that quantum coherence arises from microtubules, although in a different way from Hameroff. From the microtubules, it is suggested that coherence continues through presynaptic scaffold proteins to the synapses. The neurexin-neuroligin complex, which is situated in the synaptic cleft, but which has C-termini extending into both the pre and post synaptic areas of neurons, is proposed to provide a bridge for quantum coherence between neurons. This macroscopic quantum entanglement could extend over a large number of neurons involved with different modalities and thus represent a solution to the binding problem.

23/01/2010
CONSCIOUSNESS NOT YET EXPLAINED
Ray Tallis (see Philosophy 3) attacks the latest fad in consciousness studies, which is the believe that ever more accurate scans of the neural correlates of consciousness will tell us what consciousness actually is. The idea that finding correlations will amount to an explanation is something that has crept up on consciousness studies. In the 1990s, it used to be clearly understood that correlation was not identity. Thunder and lightning are correlated, but thunder is not the same physical thing as lightning. However, since Crick and Koch encouraged researchers to concentrate on the correlates of consciousness, somehow the basically illogical and even magical idea that correlates of consciousness are necessarily the same thing as consciousness has been allowed to edge its way into consciousness studies.

Tallis is also dissatisfied with the approach of mainstream neuroscience and its philosophical under-labourers to the issues of the self and freewill. The mainstream denounces these notions as non-existent or illusions. Tallis takes effectively the view that declaring the data that they have been called on to explain (self and conscious will) to be non-existent, does not constitute an explanation, and therefore something must be missing from neuroscience's approach.

In the end it turns out that Tallis is a 'mysterian' or 'new mysterian'. Science is concerned with objective measurement abstracted away from subjective bias, while consciousness is subjectivity, and therefore science can never explained consciousness. Tallis does not seem to be a dualist, so this leaves us in a limbo with no explanation for consciousness at all. This seems a rather defeatist position. If we're not dualists, we ought to accept consciousness as part of the physical universe, which should ultimately be capable of being explained by physics.

23/01/2010
NEUROLIGINS & NEUREXINS
Neurologins and neurexins assume importance in an alternative to Hameroff's suggestions for widespread quantum coherence. These are cell adhesion molecules that are thought to bind to one another, and to interact with proteins within neurons. They connect the presynaptic area of one neuron to the postsynaptic area of another, mediate signalling across the synaptic cleft, and specify synaptic functions and the properties of neural circuits. The shape of the neurexin-neuroligin complex suggests that it forms an interaction layer in the synaptic cleft, with C-terminals emerging from the complex, on opposite sides of the synaptic cleft. Neurexins come in many isoforms, and it is suggested that these could code for different interactions at the synapses. With respect to quantum consciousness, it has been suggested that coherence arising around microtubules might pass through presynaptic scaffold proteins and thence through neurexins and neuroligins to neighbouring neurons, which could allow a whole neuronal assembly to become coherent.

21/01/2010:
DAVID ROSE REVISITED
I looked at Rose's book on consciousness some months ago. However, the reason for his acute problem with 'fundamental' and quantum theories of consciousness, and for his over emphasis on the question of levels, in fact lies in a category error, common enough in consciousness studies, as between an information processing system as such and consciousness. Because he seems only to think in terms of total neural networks and their associated synapses and neurotransmitters, he can not conceive possibility of consciousness arising at the sub-neuronal level. Despite his reductionist slant, he seems to miss the point of the way reductionist science is done. The underlying force of an emergent property such as the liquidity of water does not have to be understood in terms of the totality of the water, because it derives from electric charge at the lowest level, the level of electrons.

13/01/2010

BIOPHYSICS OF NEURONAL MICROTUBULES
This 2004 paper, (see: Danko Geoergiev 2) in Biomedical Reviews is possibly the clearest account of Geogiev's view of microtubules as quantum information processors. Amino acid 'tails' projecting 4-5 nanometres from the surface of microtubules play a key role in this theory. The tails interact with the electric field, with water molecules, and with ions bound to the microtubular surface, to produce solitons (solitary quantum waves that, even in collisions with other waves, retain their shape and velocity). Collisions of these solitons are suggested to act as logic gates, and the conformation of the tubulin tails controls microtubule associated proteins (MAPs) and motor proteins, which in turn could constitute a computational output. It is also suggested that tubulin tails could regulate the output of neurotransmitters from synapses via presynaptic scaffold proteins. This would bring microtubules centre stage, within the conventional model of the brain's information processing. One advantage of this model is that it does not require the shielding from decoherence envisaged in the better known Hameroff version of microtubule quantum processing, because the process suggested could occur within the normal time to decoherence in brain conditions.

On the basis of a mathematical model developed by the quantum consciousness researchers Jibu & Yasue, the authors claim to show that signals from the local electric field could govern the conformation of the tubulin tails. These tails are negatively charged, and the study predicts that they would attract positive ions, and form a Debye layer. It is suggested that the projecting tubulin tails plus hydration shells (water molecules orientated by ions) around the tails could make the microtubules very sensitive to their environment. Further, the interaction between the tubulin tails and the electric field could induce conformational waves in the tubulin tails. Mathematical modelling suggests the feasibility of solitons. Collisions of these and resulting shifts along the microtubule could act as logic gates. Studies show binding between tubulin tails and MAPs and motor proteins. Tubulin tail contact with MAPs, motor proteins and presynaptic scaffold proteins could allow computational output.

Control of synapses by microtubules is another, if more speculative possibility opened up by this paper. The binding of tubulin tails with motor proteins implies regulation of the flow of vesicles and neurotransmitters to synapses. It is further suggested that tubulin tail conformations could control the presynaptic scaffold proteins that organise synapses, and regulate the release of neurotransmitters. Studies show a direct interaction with synaptotagmin-1, a protein that offsets the destabilising influence of Ca2+ ions at axon terminals. It is stressed that the relationship between axon spikes and synaptic firing is very variable, and this makes additional tuning by microtubules feasible.

10/01/2010:

WHY PHYSICALISM ENTAILS PANPSYCHISM
The philosopher Galen Strawson argues for a form of panpsychism rather than quantum consciousness. (see: Other Quantum 5). However, his argument as to the difficulty of extracting consciousness from physical matter is similar to many of the arguments for considering a quantum solution for consciousness. Further, some versions of quantum consciousness provide effective answers to the more forcible arguments against panpsychism. Firstly, they can deal with the lack of any apparent experiental qualities in either fundamental particles or larger scale inanimate matter. The quanta can be seen as proto-experiental, not conscious in themselves, but having the potential, in particular circumstances to give rise to consciousness. Secondly, some versions of quantum consciousness get over the problem of how a very large number of fundamental particles could combine into a conscious mind, by proposing the existence of macroscopic quantum features in the brain.

Strawson criticises mainstream thinkers, including Dennett, for being closet Cartesians, in that they have an underlying assumption that consciousness is not physical. Strawson views the whole universe as physical. Consciousness is seen as the best known fact about ourselves. Its existence cannot therefore be denied, and as it exists, and everything is physical, consciousness must be physical. Consciousness arises when physical matter is put together in a particular way in brains. For conscious experience to arise from physical matter, it is argued that physical matter must have some of the experiental about it. He is not impressed by the concept of consciousness as an emergent property. In looking at the classic example of the liquidity of water as an emergent property, he points out that this is a function of attractions between electric dipoles, but no analogous underling reason for the emergence of consciousness is available.

06/01/2010: TUBULIN 'TAILS': The latest review takes a look at another paper by Danko Georgiev, 'Dissipationless waves for information transfer in neurobiology'. This is mainly an examination of the 'tails' attached to each unit of tubulin in a microtubule. It is Georgiev's contention that these tails play a key role in information processing and possibly consciousness within neurons. The tails, which are 4-5 nanometres long, are extremely sensitive to environmental conditions and local electric fields. They are suggested to have many possible conformations, to modulate the action of motor proteins, attach to microtubule associated proteins, and to microtubule anchored enzymes. It is suggested that ordered water molecules on the microtubule surface interact with the tubulin tails and the local electromagnetic field to produce long-range correlations. The paper also suggests the possibility of a link between this aspect of the microtubules and synaptic vesicles via the presynaptic protein scaffold.

02/01/2010: The first review of the new year looks at 'Consciousness - The Science of Subjectivity' by Antii Revonsuo of Skovde University in Sweden. This book is useful in providing clear expositions and criticisms of a wide range of mainstream consciousness theories. Revonsuo emphasises the distinction between theories of consciousness that concentrate on subjective experience and qualia, and theories that view consciousness as related to information processing. He is particularly critical of theories that only explain information processing in the brain, and deny or avoid subjective experience and qualia. He is also not afraid to criticise leading consciousness study figures, such as Dennett.

23/12/2009: A new category has been added under Quantum Mind Theories, which covers the models put forward by Danko Georgiev. This is at root based on Penrose's objective reduction to arrive at consciousness, but proposes different quantum structures within the neuron that allow shorter times to decoherence that do not conflict with Tegmark's calculations. A further review has also been added with the new category, discussing the downstream influence of microtubular solitons on presynaptic proteins and synaptic firing.

21/12/2009: The latest review covers a further paper by Danko Georgiev outlining the possibility of solitary wave quanta propagating along the microtubules as a result of interaction between the electric dipoles of structured water and the projecting tubulin 'tails' of the microtubules. This is suggested to allow interaction between microtubules and synapses.

17/12/2009: CLIMATEGATE: I don't wish to discuss the details of this particular scandal, nor the rights and wrongs of climate monitoring, but the allegations of manipulation of publications and data presentation and bullying of those who do not toe the line has a sadly familiar ring for anyone familiar with the ridicule, aggression and cold shouldering of non-conforming data or ideas that characterises much of consciousness studies and particularly its approach or lack of it to quantum consciousness theories. How far have we drifted from the clarity of thought that first emerged in ancient Greece and resurfaced in early modern times, and what this portend for the future of science?

16/12/09: The latest review published under Key Articles 5 is a synthesis of two papers by Danko Georgiev, who is one of the few researchers actively investigating consciousness relative to quantum activity in neurons. He disagrees with Hameroff's model in a number of respects, including the function of gap junctions. Instead, he proposes a mechanism based on quantum brain dynamics ideas developed by Jibu and Yasue and also Vitiello. However, despite rejecting some of Hameroff's neural mechanisms, he still appears to rely on Penrose's concept of objective reduction of macroscopic coherence in the brain, to give access to consciousness/understanding at the fundamental spacetime level. His approach has the advantage of needing quantum coherence to be sustained for a shorter time than Tegmark's calculated 10^-13 for quantum decoherence in the brain, thus, if his scheme is feasible, removing the most forceful argument against quantum consciousness.

08/12/09: LIBET and SOON EXPERIMENTS: An online paper by Alexander Batthyany argues against the mainstream view that experiments by Libet refute the existence of freewill. The author distinguishes between, on the one hand, actions and intentions that appear to arise from the conscious will, and on the other urges or desires, such as hunger that arise spontaneously, and are passive in the sense of being without any feeling of deriving from the conscious will. The author argues that the actions required of subjects in the Libet experiments and also the more recent experiments by Soon, C.S. depend on passive-type urges, and are therefore invalid as a basis for the refutation of freewill.

07/12/09: INTROSPECTION: A paper by Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol of the Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee, Paris, published in the latest issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, provides a new twist to the long running dispute over the validity of introspective reports. The argument against taking note of introspective reports is that they are frequently wrong, reporting things that are not there, failing to report things that are there, and misrepresenting even those things that are correctly perceived. The researchers mention a favourite of popular consciousness books, a woman in a gorilla suit unnoticed by people playing a ball game. However, they argue that these failures to accurately register external stimuli are actually irrelevant. Introspection is about what the subject is actually experiencing, and there is no requirement for this to have a particular correspondence to the external world.

04/12/09: The latest summary/review deals with Joseph LeDoux's book, 'Synaptic Self'. This book provides a good discussion of brain plasticity and neuron processes with respect to the instantiation of memory. There is also an interesting account of the relationship between working memory and executive functions in the prefrontal and emotional processing within the brain/body. However, as with other neuroscience books of this kind, the attempt to extend the discussion to include consciousness fails. Consciousness seems to mainly be given a circumscribed role within working memory, and even here there is no attempt to suggest how it arises in any part of the brain, or how it does anything that could not just as well be done by unconscious processing. The use of the word 'self' in the title of the book seems to be something of a misnomer, as there is little attempt to describe the self or to distinguish it from consciousness.